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ABSTRACT
As a social species, correct emotional perception is so vital, that the
human brain has evolved a mechanism to control attentional choices by exerting
a narrowed field of perception during danger, called the scope of attention (SoA).
The SoA determines what information will be focused on or ignored by blocking
the perception of non-relevant items and increasing selective focus on danger;
even if danger is merely a sad-face. The emotional items blocked from
perception cannot be remembered because they were never perceived. But,
attention-control to emotional stimuli also varies with mood, as seen in mooddisorders. A mood-disorder’s effect upon the SoA has not been extensively
studied, and no investigations examining the SoA in mood-disorders versus
healthy individuals could be found in the literature. Thus, this thesis considers the
question: Do mood disorders affect the SoA during emotional interactions? To
investigate this, we evaluated individual differences in the SoA for those with or
without mood-disorder symptomology, during visual processing of emotionallysalient stimuli. We measured the responses to emotionally-salient distracting
faces near to, and far from, the target face. Results indicated that the state
anxiety group identified target emotions more slowly than did healthy individuals.
In addition, those with state anxiety had a comparable SoA to healthy individuals,
except while viewing a sad target with sad, far away distractors. This negative
environment broadened the state groups SOA, instead of narrowing it. Thus, the
state anxiety group perceived an overabundance of negative emotional content
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from the surrounding faces. Depression and trait anxiety groups SoAs were
comparable to healthy controls during sad targets, but not happy. The scope of
attention for those with depression and trait anxiety narrowed when the target
was a happy face and the distracting faces were in close proximity to the target.
Thus, the depression and trait anxiety groups did not perceive the emotional
content of the surrounding faces. These results suggest that state anxiolytics are
relatively slower in responding to emotional information in a facial stimulus, but
once they identify the face as happy at close range, they achieve the same,
broad, scope of attention as healthy individuals. However, state anxiolytics are
particularly affected when negative emotional items are experienced with, distant,
negative surrounding emotions. By contrast, once depressives and trait
anxiolytics identify a positive emotional expression, they are restricted in their
ability to recognize contrasting or changing expressions in individuals who are in
close proximity to their focus of attention. Therefore, individuals with high trait
anxiety or depression have a relatively narrower SoA, restricting their perception
of close-range emotional-interactions, and those with state anxiety have a
relatively broader SoA, enhancing their perception of distant, negative, emotional
interactions. The present findings indicate that individuals with mood disorders
process emotional information differently than healthy individuals.
Keywords: depression, mood-disorder, scope of attention, state anxiety,
trait anxiety, perception.
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CHAPTER ONE:
MOOD AND THE SCOPE OF ATTENTION

Choosing what to focus on, and what to ignore, affects the human
perception of life; but so does one’s mood. For most humans, mood can become
more intense during emotional interactions. But emotions are transient, and if a
low or high mood arises, it does not significantly affect the human perception of
life negatively. But, for some, high mood-states are long-term, and cause
negative behavioral, perceptual, and physiological consequences. Herein, we
compare healthy individuals to those with mood pathology to ascertain if
differences in the range or scope of attention affect the perception of the
emotional world.

Disorders of Mood and Control of Attention
The World Health Organization (2017) estimates 264 million people,
globally, will experience clinical levels (i.e., high, sustained or reoccurring
impairment with measurable symptomology) of depression, and 284 million will
experience an anxiety disorder. It is common to have more than one mooddisorder at a time (Lamers, et al., 2019; Langer et al., 2019). An estimated 85%
of those who suffer mood-disorders reported serious to moderate impairment in
daily functioning including attention deficits (World Health Organization, 2017).
Stressful situations (i.e., test, evaluative, or competitive conditions; see Eysenck,
1992, for a review), trigger the worrying common to mood-disorders. Yet, it is
1

common to find that individuals who choose to be in a highly attention-dependent
environment (e.g., university student populations) have high percentages of
anxiety and depression (Beiter, et al., 2015; Latiff, & Aszahari, 2014; Mahmoud,
Staten, Hall, & Lennie, 2012). This seems counterintuitive as mood-disorders are
defined as ‘disorders of attention’ (Psychological Association Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual, 2013), and one would hypothesize that individuals prone to
these disorders would gravitate to less stressful surroundings to increase their
chances of survival in these environments. However, this is not the case.
Attention and Survival
Attention is the ability to select the information that one wishes to identify,
or focus on (Ahmed, & de Fockert, 2012; Bartés-Serrallonga et al., 2014;
Haladjian, & Montemayor, 2015; Lupytan, 2015; Mack & Clarke, 2012; Moore &
Zirnsak, 2017; Wolf et al., 2018; Wolf & Pfeiffer, 2014). Attention can concern a
single sensory source (e.g., something seen, but not heard, or felt) or can be
distributed among several information sources (Kolb, & Whishaw, 2015; Stone,
2012; Wright, &Ward, 2008). The focus of attention can be internal (i.e.,
thoughts), or external (i.e., environmental stimuli) (Chun, Golomb, & TurkBrowne, 2011). For the mechanism of attentional control to respond to the
environment effectively, the brain must have the capacity to focus on certain
stimuli to the exclusion of others. The brain’s ability to discriminate stimuli is
called selective attention, (Ahmed, & de Fockert, 2012; Ku, 2018; Moore &
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Zirnsak, 2017; to name a few). The brain regulates what information is processed
by a mechanism called attentional control (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Basic Attention Control.
For 5 seconds, look for the ‘X’ on both sides of the image above. Attentional
control mechanisms are utilized in processing both the left and right sides . The
left requires less neural energy to focus on X; the right requires more. The left
requires less ability to ignore non-relevant information (i.e., things that were not
the X); the right requires more ability to ignore irrelevant information.

Attentional control allows an increase or decrease in the scope of the
visual field based on the perceived survival relevance of a stimulus (Kolb, &
Whishaw, 2015; Stöttinger, & Perner, 2006). This adaptive mechanism exerts a
higher degree of control over what information is processed including emotional
interactions, allowing exclusion of elements distracting from the current survival
needs (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Survival Attention Control.
As dangerous stimuli get physically closer (left), attention control increases, to
increase the chance of survival. Vision narrows to focus all attentional resources
on the danger (i.e., items perceived as negative; the bear). The danger is given
‘attentional priority’. Items perceived as ‘not as dangerous’ (e.g., bunnies, trees),
or less likely to cause harm (i.e., farther away) are excluded from sight and
perception (right) (Clipart Library, 2019).

Interestingly, those with clinical level depression (Dai, & Feng, 2011; Dai,
Feng, & Koster, 2011) or anxiety (Berggren, Blonievsky, & Derakshan, 2015)
experience decreased attentional control.
Attention’s Scope and Perception
Attentional control ignores distractions by enabling the brain to focus
neural resources (i.e., use selective attention) on specific stimuli which fall within
certain visually perceivable distances, or ranges, called the scope of attention
(Bartés-Serrallonga et al., 2014; Chen, Marshall, Weidner, & Fink, 2009;
Haladjian, & Montemayor, 2015; Moore & Zirnsak, 2017; Rowe, Hirsh, &
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Anderson, 2007; Wolf et al., 2018; Wolf & Pfeiffer, 2014). The scope of attention
limits how much of the visual field surrounding the target stimulus will be
perceived. A broad scope of attention allows more information to be perceived,
and a narrow scope of attention allows fewer items to be perceived. Therefore,
the scope of attention regulates human visual perception (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Broad and Narrow Scope of Attention.
Attentional control responds to emotional stimuli by either broadening or
narrowing the scope of attention’s range. This allows only survival relevant
information to be perceived (i.e., white area inside gray circles). Gray circle =
scope of attention, Broad = advantageous if no threat exists, Narrow =
advantageous if threat exists. Items outside the circles (in light gray) cannot be
perceived.

Perception and Social Interactions
To become aware of something through the human senses (e.g., visual
and/or auditory and/or tactile), is called perception (Coon, & Mitterer, 2008;
5

Gregory, 1970; 1974; 1987; 1997; 2006; 2008; Haladjian, & Montemayor, 2015;
Kolb, & Whishaw, 2015; Nichols, Brett, Andersson, Wager, & Poline, 2005;
Pomerantz, 2003; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007; Snyder, 2015). Herein, we will
evaluate visual sensory perception.
Perception obviously includes social interactions (i.e., reoccurring contact
with other humans; Boyd, & Richerson, 2009) which are vital to human survival
(Coon, & Mitterer, 2008; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). But, how much we
perceive of the world is directly related to the range of our scope of attention at
the time of the experience (Figure 3). Therefore, over the course of human
evolution, perception-related social attention allowed humans to become more
adept at identifying (Stone, 2012; Whishaw, 2015), categorizing (Montemayor, &
Haladjian, 2015), and selecting pertinent aspects of their social environment,
thus increasing the chances of human personal and group/social survival
(Brosch, Pourtois, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2011; Graziano, 2014; Sander, &
Vuilleumier, 2011). The identified and categorized information perceived by the
individual must then be stored in the brain through a process called memory
(Ahmed, & de Fockert, 2012; Amso & Scerif, 2015; Bartés-Serrallonga et al.,
2014; Chun, Golomb,& Turk-Browne, 2011; Coon, & Mitterer, 2008; Haladjian, &
Montemayor, 2015; Ku, 2018).
Information not perceived cannot be moved to memory (Heurley, &
Ferrier, 2015; Martin, 1992; Mitterer, Horschig, Müsseler, & Majid, 2009). The
human brain uses the items that can be perceived through visual attention, and
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stored within memory, to construct an active, neural-processed map of the world
(Coon, & Mitterer, 2008; Gregory, 1970, 1974, 1987, 1997, 2006, 2008;
Haladjian, & Montemayor, 2015). Therefore, what humans are able to perceive
through their current scope of attention, at any given moment, becomes their
individual map of ‘life’.
Perception’s Cyclic Nature
This perceived map of one’s life is strongly influenced by previous
experiences (Ku, 2018; Schacter, Gilbert, & Wegner, 2011; Snyder, 2015; Stone,
2012). All experiences are cyclically utilized. That is, new experiences are
interpreted in terms of past experiences, then stored in memory, and eventually
utilized in the perception of future experiences. This influences the perceived
probability (i.e., degree of belief; Gregory, 2006) that an event will occur
(Gregory, 2008) during current or future interactions within the physical and
social environment (i.e., if, each time you saw a sad-faced person, someone
pinched your arm, then seeing a sad face may make you predict it is prudent to
cover your arms, move away, or prepare for pain), This cyclic perceptional
process (Friston, 2010; Tishby, & Polani, 2011) is a favorable, adaptive socialinteraction mechanism (Barrett, 2017) as it allows constant data reevaluation.
The ability to cycle information allows the brain to process information
differently depending upon whether or not that stimuli resemble previous
experiences (i.e., whether the item has been seen before; repetition). The cycling
mechanism also allows humans to make decisions about future events by
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comparing newly perceived items to items in memory. The brain deems these
items as ‘similar to’ (i.e., congruent), or ‘different from’ (i.e., incongruent)
previously experienced stimuli (Bruner, & Postman, 2006; Schmidt, Notebaert, &
Van Den Bussche, 2015; Snyder, 2015). Cycling shows the brains perceptual
attention mechanisms are constantly adapting (Coon, & Mitterer, 2008;
Haladjian, & Montemayor, 2015; Nieuwenhuis, et al., 2006) to allow the most
advantageous interpersonal and social interactions possible.
Perception’s Neural Connection to Mood
The monitoring areas of the brain that allow humans to decipher social
environments share neuro-anatomy with the regions utilized in emotion,
emotional stimuli evaluation, and internal mood (Bas-Hoogendam, van
Steenbergen, Tissier, van der Wee, & Westenberg, 2019; Izard, 2010; Kolb, &
Whishaw, 2015; Schulze, Schulze, Renneberg, Schmahl, & Niedtfeld, 2019).
This allows internal mood to interact with the perception of any social interaction,
to affect and be affected by decision making or emotions (Schnyer et al., 2015),
and to modify external factors, such as the perceived emotionality of
environmental stimuli (Barratt & Bundesen, 2012; Diéguez-Risco, Aguado,
Albert, & Hinojosa, 2015; Kanske, & Kotz, 2011). Together, these common brain
areas connect perception of social-emotional interactions to mood-state (Barrett,
2017).
During social perception, the human brain uses the repeated or cyclic
observation-process to make ‘informed decisions’ about where a conversation is
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leading (Snyder, 2015), or what threat level is present when approaching another
human (Haladjian, & Montemayor, 2015; Pomerantz, 2003). The brain utilizes the
human face to perceive the current emotional state or overall mood of another
human being, even without the presence of spoken language (Kolb, & Whishaw,
2015; Stone, 2012). This non-verbal emotional communication is so important to
human social survival that social-emotional perception is supported by neural
circuitry designed for the task of face recognition and facial expression
identification (Barrett, 2017; Mumenthaler, 2012; Xie, & Zhang, 2016). These
responses to the emotional world are affected by their congruency with the
individual’s past experience (Gilbert & Li, 2013; Haladjian, & Montemayor, 2015;
Jensen et al., 2015) and the individual’s internal mood-state (Coon, & Mitterer,
2008). Basically, humans are hard-wired to decipher other human’s emotionalmood state quickly and efficiently, and then make decisions about the person’s
future approachability.
Perception of Social Harm to the Self
In the presence or absence of potential social (or physiological) harm,
attentional control uses the scope of attention like a cage, or bubble, to visually
scale the amount of environmental information which can be observed (Öhman,
2000; Öhman, & Mineka, 2001; Olsson, & Phelps, 2007) (Figure 3). It is
important to note that whether the perceived social harm is psychological or
physiological, the scope of attention responds to the emotional strength (i.e.,
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salience), and perceived ‘good-ness’ or ‘bad-ness’ (valence) of the stimuli
(Barratt, & Bundesen, 2012; Chen, Marshall, Weidner, & Fink, 2009). In healthy
adults, the scope of attention narrows the range of items which can be perceived
when negative emotional stimuli replace neutral or positive stimuli. (BartésSerrallonga et al., 2014; Haladjian, & Montemayor, 2015; Moore & Zirnsak, 2017;
Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007; Wolf et al., 2018; Wolf & Pfeiffer, 2014) (Figure
4).

Figure 4. Perceived Emotionality’s Effect on the Scope of Attention.
The perceived ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of stimuli triggers the scope of attention to
respond. In healthy participants, the scope narrows to negative stimuli and
broadens to positive stimuli. Gray circle represents the scope of attention. Target
(i.e., center image in circle) (O’Donnell, & Koshino, 2017).

Social Transmission of Mood
In social interactions, attention-resources are highly focused on the shortlived feelings (i.e., emotions) of others. Perceived or experienced emotions can
produce changes in mood. Moods are defined as having no clear starting or
‘formation’ point (Izard, 2010), but a person’s mood-state is innately perceivable
by other humans (Eldar, Rutledge, Dolan, & Niv, 2016; Eldar et al., 2016). This
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suggests that mood is socially-transmittable. Research shows that mood also
affects internal information processing. For example, when a person is in a
positive mood, and then encounters someone in a negative mood, a moodchange occurs in response (Rey, et al., 2014). Interestingly, this change occurs
before the human brain has time to rationally evaluate if a mood-change is
preferable (Bas-Hoogendam, et al, 2018; Bas-Hoogendam, et al., 2019).
This social transmission of mood allows one human to evaluate another
human’s level of, or need for, social interaction or support, while reinforcing
information regarding danger level (Bishop, Duncan, Brett, & Lawrence, 2004;
Bunford, Kinney, Michael, & Klumpp, 2017; Burkhouse et al., 2018; Burklund,
Torre, Lieberman, Taylor, & Craske, 2017; Öhman, 2005). These aspects make
the social transmission of mood a way to translate the human emotional-state,
and our ‘emotional need’, to others in our vicinity. Therefore, the social
transmission of mood is a survival-based adaptation to foster intra-social support
and functioning (Bas-Hoogendam et al., 2019; Graziano, 2014); again, increasing
the groups likelihood of survival.
Mood, Emotion, and Congruency
The human ability to visually decipher others external emotional states
also influences survival ability. Once the external emotion is perceived, the
internal emotional response deploys a different amount of attention to stimuli
dependent upon the stimuli’s emotion-type (i.e., happy; positive, sad; negative)
(Amso & Scerif, 2015). As we know, emotion affects mood, and mood can be
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transferred. The transference of these moods affects others’ emotionalresponses and behavior. Positive mood enhances performance tasks (Rowe,
Hirsh, Anderson, 2007); which could lead to more efficient academic or social
functioning. Negative mood affects the judgment and the perception of objects
and events (Snyder, 2015); which can lead to problems in social relationships.
Congruency (i.e., the sameness or difference in something compared to
what you already have experienced) also interacts with mood. Niedenthal and
Setterland (1994) found that individuals have a heightened perception for things
that are congruent with (i.e., the same as) their current mood. But humans
cannot obscure mood-state as easily as their emotional state (Barrett, 2017). Not
being able to obscure one’s mood state could be advantageous socially, allowing
others to respond, or it could be disadvantageous psychologically, as an
individual’s level and type of mood is closely tied to their sense of emotional wellbeing. This has been well-studied in individuals with high mood levels of anxiety
(Picó-Pérez, Radua, Steward, Menchón, & Soriano-Mas, 2017) and/or
depression (Anand et al., 2005; Yin, Hou, Wang, Sui, & Yuan, 2015).
Since the emotional value of stimuli affects the human scope of attention,
and there is a preference for things that are congruent to one’s mood state, a
disorder of mood could exert significant control over one’s perception of the
world.
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Mood: Transient and Non-transient
Healthy individuals have transient (or short-duration) high-moods (i.e., one
anticipates going to a concert of their favorite band, which results in a sustained
high, positive mood for the week before) and transient low-mood (i.e., a
cherished family pet dies and a low, negative mood may be sustained for weeks).
Furthermore, transient mood-states can last for extended periods without being a
maladaptive pattern (i.e. pathologic) (Bishop, et al., 2004; Burkhouse et al.,
2018). Non-transient (i.e., long-lasting) mood-states (e.g., as in high anxiety or
high depression) cannot generally be related to a specific cause. Anxiolytic or
depressed mood decreases the likelihood of positive social interactions (Anxiety:
Picó-Pérez, Radua, Steward, Menchón, & Soriano-Mas, 2017; Depression:
Anand et al., 2005; Yin, Hou, Wang, Sui, & Yuan, 2015).
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CHAPTER TWO:
MOOD, THE BRAIN, AND BEHAVIOR

Attention Control in the Brain
The neurological ‘circuitry’ underlying attentional controls (e.g., attention,
selective attention, scope of attention, stimuli congruency) is vast (Baluch & Itti,
2011; Moore & Zirnsak, 2017; Wolf et al., 2018). These neural circuitries serve
the human brain’s need to intricately decipher, evaluate, and hypothesize about
(Gregory, 1980) environmental information. However, one’s mood-state also
affects what an individual hypothesizes to be ‘true’ (i.e., how humans
think/perceive reality), how their bodies function (Gohd, 2017; Kolb, & Whishaw,
2015), and how they respond to their environment (Shackman, Salomons,
Slagter, Fox, Winter, & Davidson, 2011).

Mood and the Cingulate Cortex
What humans visually attend to (i.e., focus on) are stimuli, and as we have
noted, stimuli’s emotion type causes specific changes in the amount of items (or
data) the human brain will allow to be attended to (e.g., the scope of attention
changes). Visual attention to emotional stimuli is accomplished by the anterior
and mid-cingulate cortex (ACC and MCC, respectively; Bush, Luu, & Posner,
2000; Chen, Marshall, Weidner, & Fink, 2009; Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011;
Haladjian, & Montemayor, 2015; Hall, 2011) (Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Emotional Attention in the Brain: Rostral Cingulate Cortex.
(Left) Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and adjoining mid-cingulate cortex (MCC)
are highlighted in yellow (Hall, 2011). (Right) Cognitive control (i.e., making
decisions) is accomplished by the mid-cingulate (aMCC: green) and posteriorcingulate (pMCC: red). The affective (i.e., emotionally-linked) division is the
pregenual (pgACC: orange) and subgenual (sgACC: blue). These adjoining
locations allow the ACC/MCC to access thought, emotion (including fear via
amygdalae), and mood related input (Adapted from: Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000).

Subtle, rapid cognitive-emotional changes can be assessed by the
ACC/MCCs monitoring ability (e.g., interpretation of facial expressions, body
posture, and verbal tone). These changes can be measured through
neuroimaging (Panksepp & Biven, 2012; Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, & Price,
2013). Higher mood scorers have significantly higher or lower neural excitation
(i.e., chemical electrical ‘firing’ of neurons) in one brain region, or between
multiple regions (i.e., in functionally connected brain areas; Kolb, & Whishaw,
2015) when responding to an object (generally appearing on a monitor screen,
as in the experiment, herein).
Labuschagne, and colleges (2012) found higher ACC activation (i.e. more
utilization of neural resources) in anxiety sufferers than in healthy controls during
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the viewing of emotionally negative stimuli (Berggren, et al, 2015; Berggren &
Derakshan, 2013). In depressives, Miskowiak et al. (2015) found that both highrisk adult twins (i.e., one twin with clinical depression history, one without)
showed increased neural response to happy and fearful faces in the dorsal ACC
and displayed increased attention vigilance for fearful faces, compared to lowrisk twins (i.e., neither twin had a history if depression) (also see Bodenschatz,
Skopinceva, Kersting, Quirin, & Suslow, 2018 regarding sad face responses in
depressives).
Socially, the ACC/MCC allows for an understanding of another person’s
internal mood alterations, and gives information about the probability of external
aggressiveness or kindness (Shackman, Salomons, Slagter, Fox, Winter, &
Davidson, 2011). The ACC/MCC also monitors emotion-related or ‘affective’
conflicts or congruencies (i.e., like seeing a happy friend surrounded by sad
friends; ☺). But when the ACC is unable to properly process incoming data, a
maladaptive loop of emotional distress is created (Polli, et al., 2005), which
drains attentional resources (Wei, Szameitat, Müller, Schubert, & Zhou, 2013).
This attentional resource drain, inherent to mood-related emotional processing,
has been known to affect the rate of neural processing (i.e., creating slower
reaction times to stimuli) and thus is evidenced in behaviors.

Mood-disorders and Behavior
Behaviorally, mood disorders (e.g., anxiety, depression) share
symptomology, making them hard to differentiate (i.e., those with depression and
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anxiolytic disorders experience cyclic thought patterns; Psychological Association
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 2013; Schulze, Schulze, Renneberg, Schmahl,
& Niedtfeld, 2019; World Health Organization, 2017). The occurrence of mooddisorder comorbidity is high (depression is often accompanied by anxiety, and
vice-versa; Lamers, et al., 2019; Langer et al., 2019). This may explain mooddisorder overlaps in symptomology. These factors can create research
confounds, but it remains the case that the unique behavioral effects of the
different mood disorders have been demonstrated in human subjects
(Arbabshirani, et al., 2017; Woo, Chang, Lindquist, & Wager, 2017) even in the
presence of mood-comorbidities (Spielberger, et, al., 1983; Vitasari, et al., 2011;
Yang, et al., 2016). Herein, we will investigate whether high mood, human
participants, with mood-disorder comorbidities exhibit unique or differential
behavioral effects than controls, by using an attention task which has been
shown to engage the scope of attention in healthy subjects.
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CHAPTER THREE:
MOOD MEASUREMENT: TASK AND THEORY

The Flanker Task
One of the best-known measurements of attention is the flanker task
(Ericksen and Erickson, 1974; Eriksen, & Schultz, 1979; Eriksen, & Spencer,
1969; Schmidt, & De Houwer, 2011; Wendt,& Luna-Rodriguez, 2009) . The
flanker task has been shown to be effective in a large range of experimental
paradigms, such as during stimuli sequences (Schmidt, & De Houwer, 2011;
Nieuwenhuis, et al., 2006; Wendt, & Luna-Rodriguez, 2009),with emotional
stimuli (Barratt & Bundesen, 2012; Fenske, & Eastwood, 2003), and during the
use of electrophysiology/neuro-imaging (Purmann, Badd, Luna-Rodriguez, &
Wendt, 2010; Ullsperger, & von Cramon, 2001; Lamers, et al., 2019).
During the flanker task, participants respond to a centered target stimulus
which is ‘flanked’ or surrounded by distractor stimuli on either side (Eriksen, &
Eriksen, 1974; Eriksen, & Schultz, 1979). The flankers may be the same as the
target (congruent; → → →) or different from the target (incongruent;  → ).
Human neuro-imaging and computationally modeled data have shown congruent
trials produce less neuronal excitation than incongruent trials (Kinoshita et al.,
2011). When the mean response on incongruent trials is significantly longer (i.e.,
slower) than the mean response on congruent trials, it is known as a congruency
effect (Barratt & Bundesen, 2012; Eriksen, & Eriksen, 1974; Janczyk, & Ulrich,
2019) (Table 1).
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Table 1. Effect Calculations

The flanker task has the capacity to assess the participant’s inhibitory
processes (i.e., the individual’s ability to ignore irrelevant data) during responses
to the target which is in the presence of a distractor. The measurement of these
inhibitory processes allows the breath of the scope of attention to be calculated
via the attentional scope effect (Table 1). This makes the flanker task especially
suited for the emotion-based attentional scope experimentation, herein.
Effects of Stimuli and Distractors
In addition to congruency, there are several other well-established effects
with the flanker task and some of these interact with congruency (Eriksen, &
Eriksen, 1974). These include effects based in the nature of the target stimulus
(e.g., target effects; Table 1).Target effects occur where one target takes longer
to respond to than another (Eriksen, & Eriksen, 1974; Eriksen, & Schultz, 1979;
Neumann, & DeSchepper, 1991; Li, Miller, & Desimone, 1993). Research using
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emotional stimuli (Fenske, & Eastwood, 2003) have demonstrated target effects
based in the valence (i.e., positive emotion vs. negative emotion) of the target.
Reaction time is generally longer for negative emotional stimuli.
An effect can also be seen in the location of the distractor in reference to
the target’s location: called a distance effect (Table 1) (Eriksen, & Eriksen, 1974;
Hübner, & Töbel, 2019; Mattler, 2006; Miller, 1991; Olk, Dinu, Zielinski, &
Kopper, 2018). A distance effect occurs when distractors which are farther away
from the target are responded to more slowly than distractors which are located
closer to the target. Distance effects are common and can be helpful in the
measurement and confirmation of scope of attention changes when comparing
one target-type or distractor-type to another (Ahmed, & de Fockert, 2012;
Hübner, & Töbel, 2019; Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007).
An attentional scope effect (i.e., the change of the perceptible, scope of
attention during emotion-linked stimuli; Table 1) involves the broadening or
narrowing of the range of attention as a function of the emotional valance of the
target and/or the mood of the participant. Attentional scope effects are most
clearly measured through manipulations of congruency. A congruency effect
suggests that a relatively broader attentional scope was maintained, because,
without a broad scope of attention the similarity or difference between a target
and a distractor could not be seen. That is, a significant disparity in reaction
times between incongruent and congruent conditions requires that attentional
scope be broad enough to include the target and the distractors (Figure 6).
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Figure 6. Scope of Attention-distractor Relationship.
The difference between congruent (top) and incongruent (bottom) distractors,
during focus on happy targets can only be identified when the scope of attention
is broad enough for the distractors to be perceived.

A further assessment of attentional scope can be made by way of the
interaction of congruency and distance effects. For example, if healthy controls
have a congruency effect in the near but not the far condition, and a high mood
group has a congruency effect in the near and far conditions, we could conclude
that the high mood group had a broader attentional scope than the healthy
controls.
It is thought that both target and congruency effects may result
from feature repetition (Eriksen, & Schultz, 1979; Hübner, & Töbel, 2019;
Nieuwenhuis, et al., 2006; Schmidt, & De Houwer, 2011; Schmidt, Notebaert, &
Van Den Bussche, 2015). The more humans see something, the easier it is to
learn what to do in response to that ‘thing’ the next time it is presented in the
21

environment. However, feature repetition does not explain why objects closer to
the target are responded to faster than objects farther away. Alternatively, target,
distractor and distance effects could be a product of conflict monitoring (i.e., in
the ACC/MCC of healthy individuals), as all target and distractor changes would
be processed differently, corresponding to the current level of danger. This would
even apply to distance, as something closer to you (i.e., allowing you access to
more data for evaluation and categorization) could be visually evaluated faster
than something farther away (Eriksen, & Eriksen, 1974; Hübner, & Töbel, 2019;
Mattler, 2006; Miller, 1991).
Effects of Emotional Stimuli
To gauge the effects of attentional scope, we need a device that will
reliably and accurately transmit the proper emotion to the participant. One of the
most intuitive ways humans communicate emotional information is through facial
expressions. Keltner, and Ekman (2003) found that facial emotions are
universally recognized, are associated with specific facial expressions, and are
direct indicators of internal affective attitudes and dispositions (i.e., mood-state).
Hoemann and Barrett (2018) found that sensory feedback from movement of
facial muscles contributed to the internal occurrence of the emotional feeling (i.e.,
creating a feedback loop). This emotional-physiological feedback loop allows the
individual to influence their own emotion state by the initiation of voluntary facial
expressions (Beamish, Foster, Edwards, & Torsten, 2019; for further discussion
of the feedback loop see Pressman, Jenkins, & Moskowitz, 2019). Emotions
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result in physical and psychological changes (Schacter, Gilbert, & Wegner, 2011)
that influence personal behaviors (Wilson-Mendenhall, Henriques, Barsalou, &
Barrett, 2019) and the behaviors of others (Beamish, et al., 2019) in
evolutionarily adaptive ways. The moment to moment human emotional
experience corresponds to the specific patterns of emotional stimuli seen in facial
expressions (Barrett, 2017). Both the monitoring of one’s own emotional states
and the monitoring of emotions in others play a vital role in human perception
(Gayet, Van der Stigchel, & Paffen, 2014; Gröne et al., 2015).
These results show substantial evidence that the human face is a reliable,
attention-grabbing stimulus, which can accurately transmit human emotional
states to other humans without further output (i.e., without additional speaking,
writing, etc.). Interestingly, schematic representations of the human face (i.e.,☺,
or ) produce similar neural activations to actual images of human faces during
functional magnetic resonance imaging (Britton, Shin, Barrett, Rauch, & Wright,
2008; Wright, Martis, Shin, Fischer, & Rauch, 2002), making schematic
emotional stimuli, an effective and reliable tool for the transmission and
assessment of visual emotional attention content in behavioral experimentation.
Effects of Emotional Face Stimuli
The effects of emotional face stimuli during attention tasks are well
documented. Barratt and Bundesen (2012), Gable and Harmon-Jones (2012),
and Rowe, Hirsh, and Anderson (2007) found consistent results, producing
significantly longer response times to negative emotions (e.g., sad faces;) than
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to positive (e.g., happy faces;☺). Rowe, Hirsh, and Anderson (2007) also found
positive emotional states broaden the scope of attention. Gable and HarmonJones (2012) found negative emotional states narrow thought and action in
healthy subjects.
Most importantly, Barratt and Bundesen (2012) found congruency effects
to happy-target schematic faces and not sad faces; demonstrating that viewing
negative environmental stimuli narrowed the scope of attention in healthy
subjects. In other words, when negative emotional stimuli were presented to the
participant, the breath of their field of visual perception narrowed. This narrowing
of the perceptible world reduced the observable emotional stimuli around the
negative target (i.e., a narrow attentional scope effect; Table 1). These results
indicate that emotional schematic faces can be used to trigger measurable
changes in the scope of attention (Figure 7).

Figure 7. Scope of Attention during Schematic Emotional Targets.
Schematic emotional targets (i.e., center image) affect the modulation, or the
breath of the stimuli perceived through the scope of attention (O’Donnell &
Koshino, 2017), in healthy individuals.
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Effects of Distance upon Stimuli Perception
By manipulating the relative distance of the emotional distractor-faces, we
get a glimpse of how much information the individual’s scope of attention is
allowing them to perceive while processing a particular target emotion (i.e., while
focusing on an emotional face-type; ☺ or , can the participant perceive the
difference, or do they exhibit a different RT to distractors which are happy or
sad; ☺☺☺ or ☺, ☺☺ or ), in the near location (i.e., ☺☺☺) and the far
location (i.e., ☺ ☺ ☺) (Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007). Including distance as a
factor provides data on the relative width of the scope of attention during a
specifc, proximal or distal emotional-stimuli responses which are not the focus of
selective attention, but greatly influence the human ability to gauge our external
emotional environment (For survival see: Diéguez-Risco, Aguado, Albert, &
Hinojosa, 2015; Kanske & Kotz, 2011, for distance see: Eriksen, & Eriksen, 1974;
Hübner, & Töbel, 2019; Mattler, 2006; Miller, 1991).
Additionally, the individuals internal perception of an item is dependent
upon the inherent emotionality of the stimulus presented (i.e., whether the item
conveys ‘happy’ or ‘sad’) (Chen, Marshall, Weidner, & Fink, 2009). Therefore, it
is experimentally reasonable to extrapolate that the emotion the individual
‘perceived’ at that moment corresponds to the RT produced in response (i.e., a
sad face target with sad distractors which are presented far from the target would
be responded to slower than distractors near to the target, and therefore, the
near and far distractor conditions would be perceived as ‘different’; RT to   
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> ☺  ☺). Thus, the reaction to the distance of emotional stimuli allows the
statistical evaluation of the participant’s perception of a particular emotion-liked
target-distractor relationship. This target-distractor-distance data informs us as to
the breath of the scope of attention at the moment the participant experiences
the emotional stimuli.

Fear’s Role in the Task
Within the flanker task, the narrowing of the scope of attention to
‘negative’ stimuli is the same response exhibited during fear (Bracha, 2006). Fear
is associated with activation of the amygdala (Britton, Shin, Barrett, Rauch, &
Wright, 2008) the same area which informs the ACC when processing emotions
and mood. Fear is defined as an unpleasant emotion involving the belief that
someone or something is dangerous (Farb, Chapman, & Anderson, 2013;
Öhman, 2000) or likely to cause pain. Fear perception is possibly the most
important perception in the survival of homo-sapiens (McFadyen, 2019; Olsson,
& Phelps, 2007) specifically because fear and the scope of attention are so
interdependent in the healthy human brain. Each time we measure a participants
reaction time to a sad-face, we are gauging their fear response (Chen, Marshall,
Weidner, & Fink, 2009; Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007).
Fear Perception in Mood-disordered Individuals
Research has found that anxiolytics’ cyclic fear-based biases focus on the
expectation of future threat (Bishop et al., 2004; Burkhouse et al., 2018;
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Heitmann et al., 2017), whereas, those with depression tend to cycle
remembrances of past fears (Langer et al., 2019). For each, imagining of these
fears creates a perceived loss of emotional control (Farb, Chapman, & Anderson,
2013). This perceived loss of control is often internalized by those with mood
disorders as perceived physical threat (American Psychological Association,
2013). Research has found that the perceived threat prevalent in anxiety and
depression is accompanied by the same physiological responses (i.e., muscular
tension), and cognitive difficulties (i.e., unfocused concentration) experienced
during periods of physiologically-based fear.
It is hypothesized that this perceived fear and the ensuing loss of control
fuels cyclic thought (i.e., rumination or worry), increasing neural excitations in
mood-processing regions of the brain, and strengthening connections
perpetuating mood disorders (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, and Lyubomirsky, 2008).
The neural resources which are being limited by cyclic thoughts in mooddisorders are, therefore, less available for paying adequate attention to their
environment (Öhman, 2000). Craske, and Stein (2016) surmised that during
mood disorders, a fear-based ‘effect precedes cause’ relationship exists, where
the cyclic expectation of fear evidences in fear prior to the trigger for fear
(Craske, & Stein, 2016). Furthermore, these cyclic thought patterns of anxiety
and depression persist even when the mind is not directly thinking of the fearrelated stimuli (Bishop et al., 2004; Burkhouse et al., 2018; Heitmann et al., 2017;
Langer, et al., 2019). These constant fear-related thoughts lead to corresponding
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behaviors which can be measured during attentional tasks. The ability of
attentional tasks to evaluate mood-disorder variances is best explained by the
Attentional Control Theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007).

The Attentional Control Theory
The Attentional Control Theory (ACT: Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, &
Calvo, 2007) unites the effects of the target, the distractors, distance (from target
to distractor), and scope of attention (the breath of perceptible information) by
focusing on the comparative neural processing efficiency of those with anxiety
versus healthy controls (Eysenck, & Derakshan, 2011). The ACT attempts to
explain the effect of mood on performance during tasks that require overall
attention-control. The ACT has also been used to evaluate the attention of those
with depressive symptomology (Joormann & Gotlib, 2008) because anxiety
disorders and depression share cyclic fear-related thought patterns. And as we
have discussed, fear has a direct correlation with the activation of the scope of
attention. Research shows that the attention-related aspects of working memory
are impaired during anxiety (Eysenck, & Derakshan, 2011), and can be
compared to the impaired attentional control during depression (Bodenschatz, et
al., 2011; Dai, Feng, & Koster, 2011; Joormann & Gotlib, 2008).
Individuals scoring in the high anxiety range (Englert, & Bertrams, 2015)
or the high depression range (Joormann & Gotlib, 2008) on self-report measures
of mood, have been found to pay more attention to irrelevant stimuli (i.e., have
less attentional control and exhibit a broadened attentional scope).This
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commonality in behavioral symptomology between anxiety and depression is
thought to directly relate to cyclic thought patterns (i.e., worry over potential
consequences for failing to appropriately function in certain circumstances)
(Bodenschatz, et al., 2018).
Thus, the ACT links the ideas that cyclic thought ‘over-utilizes’ working
memory capacity, and influences performance during tasks which require
efficient attention regulation (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007).
Therefore, disorders that include ruminative symptomology are thought to hinder
efficient regulation of the scope of attention (i.e., the attentional scope)by
disrupting the balance between what the brain is attempting to focus on, and the
novel, different, threatening, or surprising stimuli to which the brain automatically
attends (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002).
Despite this similarity between anxiety and depression with regard to the
attentional scope there may be differences in regard to other aspects of attention.
Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, and Calvo (2007) argued that anxious individuals
can perform as accurately (i.e., anxiolytics achieve the same level of correct
answers) as non-anxious individuals because they counteract their automatic
processing deficits by investing additional neural effort (i.e., anxiolytics take
longer, but get the correct answer) (Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2012; see Seipp,
1991 for academic settings; Woodman & Hardy, 2003 for sports settings; Vytal,
Cornwell, Letkiewicz, Arkin, & Grillon, 2013). Thus the anxious have to mentally
try harder to obtain the same level of attentional focus as healthy controls.
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Conversely, depressives are less accurate (i.e., depressives achieve less correct
answers in the same time period as healthy controls) (Bodenschatz, et al., 2018),
with higher depressive symptomology relating to a greater bias towards happy
faces.
As a whole, those with mood-disorders have been shown to have biases
in attention control that are not seen in healthy individuals. The ACT posits that
the differences are affected by, or have caused, unhealthy resource utilization.
Evidence seems to suggest that the differences in the mood-disordered brain are
partly due to the loss or usurping of neural resources. But little research has
been conducted to determine how this maladaptive resource utilization affects
the perception of life.
Research has shown that items not perceived (for whatever reason)
cannot be moved to memory (Heurley, & Ferrier, 2015; Martin, 1992; Mitterer,
Horschig, Müsseler, & Majid, 2009), and that human visual attention is a major
source of externally derived, but memory-allocated information (Coon, & Mitterer,
2008; Haladjian, & Montemayor, 2015; Gregory, 1970, 1974, 1987, 1997, 2006,
2008) – the very information used to construct the internal ‘map of human
existence’. So, the question becomes, do mood-disorder induced deficits in
resource utilization affect the individual’s perception of life. Said differently, would
two individuals, one with a mood-disorder and one without, both perceive an
emotional situation in the same manner?
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Herein, we utilized the inherent mechanisms of attentional control to
activate the scope of attention of individuals with mood-disorder symptomology
and without, to identify if mood-disorders alter visual emotion perception.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
RATIONALE FOR THE PRESENT STUDY

Rationale
The rationale for this study is to ascertain whether mood disorders affect
the scope of attention (i.e., broaden or narrow the attentional scope effect; ASE,
Table 1) during emotional interactions; thus, altering perception. Toward this end,
we have evaluated the similarities between anxiety and depression. First,
depression and anxiety are highly correlated in the general population. Second,
both depressives (Dai, & Feng, 2011; Dai, Feng, & Koster, 2011) and anxiolytics
(Berggren, et al., 2015) experience decreased attentional control, specific to
inhibition. Third, both depression (Bodenschatz, et al., 2018) and anxiety
(Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007) share increased attention to sad
faces. Fourth, anxiety and depression share similarities in the role cyclic thoughts
play in the taxing of working memory capacity. Fifth, both tap into the fear
response and its subsequent functions. Sixth, both share brain activation areas.
These similarities lead to the supposition that there may be a single,
unifying function across anxiolytic and depressive disorders. This common
function would seem to concern the scope of attention. The scope of attention
has been shown to be active in both anxiety and depression; is affected by global
attentional control; is part of the fear response; functions by using the same brain
areas as mood disorders; functions in a feedback loop; is modulated by the
emotionality of the target; and affects the perception of emotional stimuli, thus,
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affecting performance on attention tasks. Since depression and anxiety are
highly correlated, it seems reasonable to expect that they would share similar
deficits with regard to attentional control; like the scope of attention.
Despite these reasons for predicting common attentional deficits across
the mood disorders, we can expect differences as well. Researchers found
limited evidence indicating that attentional scope may be affected differently in
anxiolytic (Bowler, et al., 2012) and depressive disorders (Bodenschatz, et al.,
2018; Dai, & Feng, 2011; Dai, Feng, & Koster, 2011; Joorman, & Gotlib, 2008). In
addition, we know anxiety sufferers achieve healthy control levels of performance
by exerting more effort, thereby taking longer than healthy controls to respond
(Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2012;
Seipp, 1991; Woodman and Hardy, 2003; Vytal, et al., 2013). But, in depression,
high brain activations decrease performance accuracy (Bodenschatz, et al.,
2018). Additionally, the effects already noted (i.e., a decreased ability to inhibit
negative distractors) may have varying consequences per each mood-disorder
(Dai, and Feng, 2011; Dai, Feng, & Koster, 2011).
To add to the possible effect variances per mood-disorder, anxiety has
two main types: Trait, (i.e., generalized to all situations or all of the time) and
state (i.e., occurring in specific situations or at this moment). Individuals with trait
anxiety (Rothbart, Ellis, Rueda, & Posner, 2003) have been found to have low
overall attentional control, which has been shown to increase RTs to stimuli
(Bowler, et al., 2012; Eysenck, Payne, & Derakshan, 2005). Berggren, et al.
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(2015) found that trait anxiolytics also have enhanced visual detection abilities to
facial emotions (i.e., are more susceptible to stimuli, regardless of stimulus type),
which is consistent with reacting faster to emotional stimuli than healthy controls.
Eysenck, Payne, & Derakshan, (2005) found that state anxiolytics (i.e.,
situational anxiety) were able to narrow scope of attention during the
presentation of negative stimuli (i.e., mirroring healthy individuals), while
confirming that state anxiolytics were slower to achieve the inhibitory response
(i.e., had significantly slower RTs). Trait anxiolytics and depressives have
commonalities as well. Trait anxiolytics and depressives were not able to narrow
scope to negative distractors (i.e., they experienced a broad ASE to negative
flanking or surrounding information that might otherwise be forcibly ignored or
excluded from the individuals perception). It is important to note that this
commonality in trait anxiolytics and depressives is reflective of the brains
processing of the distractors, and does not relate to the target; Ø) (Dai, &
Feng, 2011; Dai, Feng, & Koster, 2011). However, state, trait and depression
were also found to have a bias for fear or ‘danger’ target-items (i.e., as when a
sad face is focused upon; ØØ), allowing negative targets to capture attention,
thereby slowing the RT of the participant (Langer, et al, 2019).
Lastly, it is important to note that the findings discussed in this rationale
section generally involve longer RTs for mood disorder groups. These longer
RT’s were described in the various literary findings as: ‘low attentional control’, or
‘having a bias for’ negative or positive targets or distractors, or ‘having an inability
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to ignore’ distractors when compared with healthy individuals (i.e., there was little
commonality in the naming of the attentional factors). The non-standard labeling
of attentional control mechanisms makes findings difficult to interpret, and to use
for predictions. Once the intervening factors already discussed are added to the
evaluation of moods effect upon emotional attention processing, we are left with
an even more complex evaluation.
Therefore, to clarify the current findings, and to assist in the development
of realistic experimental expectations, the various independent findings were
integrated into a literature-based, functional representation or ‘map’ of mooddependent emotional attention responses (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Evidence of Attentional Scope Modulation.
Elongated face (i.e., Broad scope of attention; ASE = Distractors perceived) or
round face (i.e., Narrow ASE = Distractors inhibited). Shorter RT = Greater
attention control, longer RT less attention control.
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Literature-based Attention Control Map
Figure 8 represents the current emotional attention task findings,
separated by mood-state. This ‘map’ of attentional control allows us to form
expectations, or predictions, based upon the current findings related to the
modulation of the scope of attention in healthy controls, anxiolytics, and
depressives (i.e., as attentional control is measured in terms of RT and
congruency effects).
Predicting Influence of Reaction Time
Per literature, all groups would be expected to respond more slowly to sad
than to happy targets (Anxiety: Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007,
depression: Bodenschatz, et al., 2018). This is exampled in Figure 8 by state,
trait and depressions happy and sad faces having longer RTs, or being ‘higher in
the figure’, than the control groups; continued in Figure 9. left).

Figure 9. Influences on Mood Reaction Times
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Common slow RTs of state, trait and depression (left), and the additional RT
changes expected from trait anxiolytics’ ability to recognize faces (right). This
figure represents the RT differences only. See figure 10 congruency (ASE)
variance. Round face= No congruency effect (CE); Narrow ASE, Elongates face=
CE; Broad ASE.

Predicting the Influence of Emotional Faces
However, Trait anxiety has an added influence on RT deficits (Figure 9,
right) because trait sufferers are more susceptible to recognition of emotional
faces. This could evidence in slightly faster trait group RTs (i.e., compared to
state or depression); though these RTs would still be slower than for the control
group.
Predicting the Influence of Negative Distractors
The scope of attention (i.e., the attentional scope effect; ASE) for state
anxiety has been found to be comparable to controls, but depression and trait
anxiety have a strong inability to ignore negative distractors. This could result in
the ASEs for both depression and trait anxiety to becoming broad to both happy
and sad targets and distractors (i.e., to perceive distractors, a broad ASE, with
the corresponding congruency effect, is necessary) (Figure 10, A, left, and B
middle).

37

Figure 10. Influences on Mood Congruency Effects.
(A) Common inability to ignore distractors among trait anxiety and depression
(left), and the additional congruency changes expected from traits ability to
recognize faces (right). (B) The hypothesized perceptual differences between
stimuli presented and stimuli perceived during hypothesized ASEs. This figure
represents the ASE differences only. See figure 9 for RT variance. Round face=
No congruency effect (CE); Narrow ASE, Elongates face= CE; Broad ASE.

But, there is an issue with making a prediction of a broad ASEs for
depression and trait anxiety during both happy and sad targets, and distractors:
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A broad ASE has only been shown in the flanker task (i.e., used herein) with
healthy controls responding to happy targets, not sad. Moreover, we found no
flanker-task research showing a broad ASE in response to any negative-type
targets (i.e., the center, selective focus). However, a broad ASE has been shown
with negative distractors (i.e., the surrounding emotional stimuli; distractors) (Dai,
and Feng, 2011; Dai, Feng, & Koster, 2011). When we add state, trait and
depressions bias towards any negative, fear, or danger item, we cold surmise
that there may be an interaction between the modulation of the sad targets ASE,
a strong inability to ignore negative distractors, and the bias toward negative
items. (Figure 10, B).
When assessing this possible prediction, we saw a limiting factor: If sad
targets ASEs were to become broadened, they could only achieve this in one
instance: sad target congruent (i.e., ; as this is the only condition which has
the requisite negative target plus negative distractors). This could pose a
problem during the analysis, as both negative and positive distractor recognition
is necessary for a congruency effect (i.e.,  minus ☺☺ ).
Predicting the Influence of Perceived Negative Emotionality
One last evaluation of a possible sad target, ASE prediction came via the
participant’s perception of emotional content. Since both anxiety and depression
share a bias for sad targets (Bodenschatz, et al., 2018; Eysenck, Derakshan,
Santos, & Calvo, 2007) and a bias for fear or danger ‘target’ items (Langer, et al,
2019), the perceived ‘bad-ness’ of the sad target may also exert additional force
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(i.e., above and beyond that of the normal, healthy fear response) to keep the
ASE narrow (Figure 10, right).
For these reasons, we expect that there will be no measurably broad ASE
for any mood disorder during presentation of sad targets (i.e., a narrow ASE
would be expected for sad targets) (Figure 10, right).
Predicting the Influence of the Happy Target: State Anxiety
As mentioned above, healthy controls and individuals with high state
anxiety have been consistently shown to have broad scope to happy targets
(Eysenck, Payne, & Derakshan, 2005), but scope of attention for trait anxiolytic
individuals is more complicated.
Predicting the Influence of the Happy Target: Trait Anxiety
Individuals with high trait anxiety might be expected to show a broad
scope of attention during happy targets due to the inability to ignore negative
distractors. If negative surrounding emotions are perceived more than they
should be during focus on a happy target (Dai, & Feng, 2011; Dai, Feng, &
Koster, 2011), this negative distractor bias would use up attentional resources
needed to differentiate between congruent (i.e., ☺☺☺) from incongruent (i.e.,
☺). Therefore, the literature should reflect longer RT to happy incongruent
targets, only (i.e., only happy targets with the negative distractors are shown a
bias); the literature does not. In this scenario, larger congruency effects would be
seen in trait than in healthy individuals, for happy congruencies. But current
literature indicates trait anxiolytics to have generally low overall attentional
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control (Bowler, et al., 2012 ) which would shrink congruency effect due to
inability to differentiate surrounding distractors.
Another explanation may be that the sad distractor ‘over-emphasis’
activates the scope of attention to narrow in response to the heightened threat of
‘badness’ of the sad distractors. If so, this would result in the scope of attention
ignoring ones selective attention to broaden the ASE during happy targets (i.e.,
the scope of attentions happy-target selective-focus response would be the fear
response; narrow), Functionally, if these results were supported, trait anxiolytics
would then perceive happy congruent as: ☺☺☺, and happy incongruent as: ☺.
A final interaction in the trait group is that trait anxiolytics have been
shown to possess enhanced visual recognition ability for emotional target faces
(Berggren, et al., 2015). The target-face emotion has already been shown to
impact distractor perception. The enhanced recognition of emotional target faces
can be seen as a bias toward positive emotional faces allowing trait-sufferer to
accurately discern the emotion of the target faster than healthy individuals. The
enhanced recognition of the positive, emotional, happy-face should sustain a
broad ASE; allowing perception of the surroundings, salient emotions (i.e., the
‘flankers or distractors).
In sum, we find there is much evidence pointing to a broad ASE for trait
anxiolytics during happy target congruencies (i.e., allowing trait anxiolytics to
perceive the world the same as healthy controls), therefore, we predict that the
trait group will show broad ASEs in happy congruencies (Figure 10, right).
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Predicting the Influence of the Happy Target: Depression
The ASE in depression carries low attentional control (Berggren, et al.,
2015), like trait and state anxiety (Figure 10, left). However, depression carries
the same inability to ignore sad distracting information, as trait (Dai, & Feng,
2011; Dai, Feng, & Koster, 2011), but without the enhanced facial recognition
ability of trait anxiety (Figure 10, right). Therefore, happy targets may become
overwhelmed by the influence of negative distractors when depressives view
salient emotions, thereby producing happy targets with a narrow ASE (i.e., all
that would be perceived is a center, happy-faced target) (Figure 10, B).
Predicting the Influence of Distance
Remembering the Attentional Control Theory (ACT), we follow the
supposition that better resource utilization means higher attentional control.
Therefore, it is clear that the presence of a congruency effect in a near distractor
condition would indicate a broadened attentional scope (i.e., the distractors are
close to the target and can more easily be noticed or can be less easily ignored).
Such a congruency effect would be appropriate and normative for healthy
individuals in the happy target condition, but not the sad target condition. But
existing theory and research provide much less of a basis for predictions about
congruency effects in a far distractor condition. A congruency effect with far
distractors would signify an especially broad attentional scope. It is not clear
whether this effect is normative in healthy individuals under the happy target
condition. The research is lacking. But it would not be inconsistent with ACT.
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With regard to sad targets, however, a congruency effect to far distractors would
definitely be unexpected in healthy individuals, just as a congruency effect would
be unexpected for near distractors. For both near and far distractors, congruency
effects to sad targets would indicate an abnormally broadened attentional scope
for healthy adults. Since there is little research within the Attention Control
Theory (ACT) that concerns congruency and distance, we make no predictions
as to how distractor distance might interact with congruency in state, trait or
depression (i.e., Figure 10 has no distance distinction made for any group).
The reviewed findings have inconsistencies, but, overall, they suggest that
state anxiolytics may be most similar to healthy controls in their processes of
attentional control. Also, trait anxiolytics and depressives may share similar
attentional deficits. But it remains the case that there are no studies directly
comparing the attentional scope of anxiolytics and depressives to healthy
controls.
Hypotheses
When comparing the performance of state, trait or depression groups with
the performance of healthy controls, Attentional Control Theory (ACT) provides
the basis for several key predictions regarding the effects of mood on attentional
scope.
The first hypothesis below concerns replication of standard effects
previously found in the literature. Such replication is important to establishing that
the current sample of participants is typical of samples previously employed, and
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helps to establish the external validity of the findings in regards to the
hypotheses. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are the novel predictions of the study.
1. Replication of Prior Findings. We hypothesize that the healthy controls
will show target effects (i.e., happy will have faster mean RTs than Sad), distance
effects (i.e., Near faster than Far) and congruency effects (i.e., Congruent faster
than Incongruent). Further, a congruency effect will obtained for happy targets,
but not for sad targets. That is, controls will show broad attentional scope effects
(i.e., where there is a congruency effect present) during presentation of happy
targets in the near, and possibly the far, conditions.
2. Effects of Mood on Attentional Scope.
Healthy controls and state anxiety. We hypothesize that the healthy
controls and individuals with high state anxiety will show target effects, distance
effects, and congruency effects. Further, the congruency effect will obtain for
happy targets but not for sad targets. That is, the control and state anxiety
groups will both show broad attentional scope effects (ASEs) during the
presentation of happy targets in the near, and possibly the far, conditions. The
ASEs may occur more slowly for those with state anxiety than for healthy
individuals. Both groups should show a narrowed ASE to sad targets due to the
control group’s adaptive survival response to fear and states anxiety’s bias for
sad targets and for fear or danger items (Figure 11).
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Figure 11. Hypothesized Findings for This Study.
Round face= No congruency effect (CE); Narrow ASE, Elongates face= CE;
Broad ASE.

Healthy controls and trait anxiety. We hypothesize that the healthy
controls and individuals with high trait anxiety will show target effects, distance
effects, and congruency effects. Further, the congruency effect will be obtained
for happy targets but not for sad targets. That is, controls and trait anxiolytics will
show broad ASEs during presentation of happy targets in the near, and possibly
the far, conditions. However, during sad targets, consistently narrow ASEs
should be observed due a bias to sad and fear items. We predict that the trait
group’s lack of attentional control will slow RTs, but their enhanced recognition
for faces will result in acceleration of RTs to both happy and sad targets. As a
result of these opposing trends, the trait group will not be significantly different
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from the control group. The enhanced happy target recognition may help retain a
broad ASE, even in the presence of decreased inhibition to negative distractors.
RTs for those broad ASEs may be no different than the control group (Figure 11).
Healthy controls and depression. We hypothesize that the healthy
controls and those suffering from depression will both show target effects and
distance effects, but they will not show the same congruency effects. That is,
depressives will show no congruency effect for happy or sad targets due to the
increased influence of negative distractors with happy targets and the bias for
sad faces and fear items during sad targets. By contrast, controls will show broad
ASEs during presentation of happy targets in the near, and possibly the far,
conditions, and a narrow ASE to sad targets. Depressions narrow ASEs may be
significantly slower than the control groups (Figure 11).
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CHAPTER FIVE:
METHODS

Participants
This study included 170 male and female, English speaking university
students. These participants were recruited through the SONA: Participant
Management System (SONA systems, 2019) (Figure 12 and see Procedure
section, Figure 15).

Figure 12. Participant Flow Chart.
Participants (n = 170) completed experiment (i.e., psychological metrics and
attention task). Mood groups included Control, State, Trait and Depression (n =
33, respectively). High mood groups included varying degrees of mood
comorbidities, Control did not.
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The sample was used to create a Control or Healthy Group along with
three Mood Disorder Groups – State Anxiety, Trait Anxiety, and Depression.
Given the degree of comorbidity typically found for mood disorders, the number
of participants in the study was not sufficient to create mutually exclusive groups,
and would not be as representative of the current, highly comorbid mooddisorder population data. Thus, the mood disorder groups were not mutually
exclusive and the same participant could appear in more than one group. For this
reason, the groups were not directly compared in the study.
Participants with reaction times greater than 2.5 standard deviations from
the mean and/or accuracy scores lower than 0.7 of the mean were excluded from
further analyses. All participants were treated in accordance with the Ethical
Principles of Psychologists and the Code of Conduct as established by the
American Psychological Association (2013), and authorized under protocols and
procedures approved by the Institutional Review Board of California State
University, San Bernardino (Appendix A).

Materials
Psychological Metrics.
This study includes several valid, clinical-level measures used in the
diagnosis of mood disorders. These measures were used to identify participants
whose scores meet the diagnostic criteria for a mood disorder as stated in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychological
Association, 2013). Such individuals, however, cannot be deemed to have a
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clinical level mental disorder solely from the data herein. The diagnostic criteria
stated in the DSM include the use of additional measures, such as a differential
diagnosis, to rule out other concurrently occurring (co-morbid) or intervening
factors. In clinical practice, this differential would assist in identifying the subset
of patients presenting symptoms that might be attributable to something other
than a mood disorder per se (e.g., the effects of medication, another medical
condition, etc.) and would distinguish these individuals from those who do have a
mental disorder. The present study does not include the additional medical
information required to make a diagnosis of an individual mood disorder.
Instead, this study identifies mood disorder scores within the clinical range(s) of
an active mental disorder, for statistical purposes. Therefore, this studies’ data, in
isolation, should not be used as a clinical diagnosis of a mental disorder in any
participant(s).
To accomplish mood measurement, participants were instructed to fill out
the following clinical-level self-report questionnaires:
Anxiety Measurement - Trait. Trait anxiety (i.e., generalized anxiety
symptomology; occurring across many situations) was measured using the StateTrait Anxiety Inventory –Trait anxiety version (STAI-T; Spielberger, 1972;
Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) (Appendix B). The STAIT demonstrates reliability in measuring generalized anxious symptomology in
university student populations (Cronbach’s  = .79 to .93; A Cronbach’s alpha
internal consistency reliability value of .70 or above indicates good reliability;
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Cronbach, 1951) (Bee Seok, Abd Hamid, Mutang, & Ismail, 2018; Grös, Antony,
Simms, & McCabe, 2007). Participants responded to 20 questions about how
they feel ‘in general’. The responses, via computer keyboard, use a Likert scale
range of ‘1’ meaning ‘almost never’, through ‘4’ meaning ‘almost always’.
Questions addressed mood-state though perception (i.e., ‘I feel like a failure’),
attention (i.e., ‘…unimportant thoughts runs through my mind and bothers me’),
and behavior (i.e., ‘I feel …restless’) factors relating to their general, anxiolytic
level. The score range was 20 - 80. Test-maker scoring guidelines required
reverse coding (i.e., 1, 2, 3, or 4 = 4, 3, 2, 1; For example, a response of 4 would
convert to 1, or 2 to 3) of questions 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 19, & 20 before final
scoring. General (Spielberger, 1972), and university-population specific research
(Maynard, et al., 2010; Vitasari, et al., 2011) suggests a STAI-T total subthreshold score of 21-40 is indicative of clinically mild (i.e., inconsequential for
short periods), 41-60 is moderate (i.e., consequential for short periods only), or
61-80 is severe (i.e., consequential for any length of time) trait anxiety. All
participants not in the control group (See Control Measurement, below) will be
placed in a High Mood group. The 33 highest scoring individuals, with a minimum
score of 50 on the STAI-T (i.e., regardless of comorbid mood-scores), will be
referred to as the Trait group (Figure 12).
Anxiety Measurement - State. State anxiety (i.e., situational anxiety
symptomology; occurring during a specific circumstance) was measured using
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory –State anxiety version (STAI-S; Spielberger,
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1972; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) (Appendix C). The
STAI-S demonstrates reliability in measuring situational anxious symptomology
in university student populations (Cronbach’s  = .78 to .92) (Bee Seok, Abd
Hamid, Mutang, & Ismail, 2018; Grös, Antony, Simms, & McCabe, 2007).
Participants responded to 20 questions about how they feel ‘right now’ or ‘at this
moment’. The responses, via computer keyboard, use a Likert scale range of ‘1’
meaning ‘not at all’, through ‘4’ meaning ‘very much so’. Questions addressed
mood-state through perception (i.e., ‘I feel frightened’), attention (i.e., ‘I feel
confused’), and behavior (i.e., ‘I feel jittery’) factors relating to their situational,
anxiolytic level. The score range was 20 - 80. Test-maker scoring guidelines
required reverse coding (See Anxiety Measurement –Trait) of questions 21, 23,
26, 27, 30, 33, 34, 36, & 39 before final scoring. For general and universitypopulation specific research on STAI-S score sub-thresholds totals, see STAI-T.
All participants not in the control group (See Control Measurement, below) will be
placed in a High Mood group, The 33 highest scoring individuals, with a minimum
score of 50 on the STAI-S (i.e., regardless of comorbid mood-scores) will be
referred to as the State group (Figure 12).
Depression Measurement. The Center for Epidemiologic Studies
Depression scale (CESD; Eaton, Muntaner, Smith, Tien, & Ybarra, 2004; Radloff,
1977) (Appendix D) was used to measure the level of depressive symptomology
occurring both at the moment, and in general. The CESD demonstrates excellent
reliability in measuring the depressive symptomology of the university student
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population (Cronbach’s  = .87 to .92; Chang, & Chen, 2018; Jiang, et al., 2019;
Shean,& Baldwin, 2008; Umegaki, & Todo, 2017). Participants responded to 20
questions about how they have ‘felt or behaved’ during ‘the past week’. The
responses, via computer keyboard, use a Likert scale range of ‘1’ meaning
‘rarely, or less than 1 day’ (of the past week), through ‘4’ meaning ‘most of the
time, or 5-7 days’. Questions addressed mood-state though perception (i.e., ‘I felt
people disliked me’), attention (i.e., ‘I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was
doing’), and behavior (i.e., ‘I talked less than usual’) factors relating to their
depressive level. The initial score range was 20 - 80. Test-maker scoring
guidelines require all responses to have one number subtracted from each
question’s score (i.e., 1, 2, 3, or 4 = 0, 1, 2, or 3), then, questions 4, 8, 12, and 16
had to be reverse coded (i.e., 0, 1, 2, 3 = 3, 2, 1, 0) before final scoring; making
the true range 0-60. General (Radloff, 1977), and university-population specific
research (Chang, & Chen, 2018; Jiang, et al., 2019; Shean,& Baldwin, 2008;
Umegaki, & Todo, 2017) suggests a CESD total score of 16 or greater is
indicative of clinical depression.
The CESD allocates scores at or above 16 to be clinically depressed. The
revised scale (CESD-R) allows further depth in categorization of the respondents
scoring 16-60. To utilize the CESD-R scoring valances, herein, the CESD
participant responses scoring from 16-60 will reflect the sub-threshold CESD-R
scoring valances (Figure 13).
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Figure 13. Illustration of CESD Modified Scoring.
The Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression scale (CESD) and the
revised scale (CESD-R) modifications. Note: No other score-reporting
modifications were made to other psychological metrics used.

All participants not in the control group (See Control Measurement, below)
will be placed in a High Mood group, The 33 highest scoring individuals, with a
minimum score of 25 on the CESD (i.e., regardless of comorbid mood-scores)
will be referred to as the Depression group (Figure 13, bottom).
Control Measurement. Due to the inherent perception of one being ‘tested’
in a human laboratory experimental environment, some rise in anxiety may be
expected in control group participants (Bourne, 2000). Therefore, participants
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were assigned to the healthy control group based on three concurrent scores: 30
or less on the STAI-T and 30 or less on the STAI-S and 15 or less on the CESD.
Attention Task
The Emotional Flanker (EF) task is adapted from Barratt, and Bundesen’s
(2012) experiment 1, and uses emotionally expressive schematic stimuli (i.e.,
targets: happy-face and sad-face, and distractors: Sad-face, happy-face, neutralface) to test attentional inhibition (Eriksen, & Eriksen, 1974; Eriksen, & Schultz,
1979) (Figure 14).

Figure 14. Schematic Emotional Stimuli.
(O’Donnell, 2016).

The task was programmed in E-Prime 3.0 (Psychology Software Tools,
2019), and divided into one practice block comprising 20 trials where participants
were instructed to keep accuracy ratings above 95% (i.e., reported back to them
in a feedback screen). The EF had 600 main trials, separated into 10 blocks of
60 trials each. Each trial began with a fixation point (i.e., ‘+’) displayed in the
center of the screen for 500 milliseconds (ms). The stimulus target (e.g., a
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happy-face; ☺, or sad-face; ) appeared above the ‘+’ with one of three
congruency conditions (CCs). CCs included a horizontal pair of stimuli (e.g., two
happy-faces; ☺☺, sad-faces;  or neutral faces; ) surrounding, or ‘flanking’
the target, with three levels: ‘same’ as target type (i.e., congruent; ☺☺☺ or
) or ‘different’ than the target (i.e., incongruent; ☺ or ☺☺) or neither
the same nor different than the target type (i.e., neutral; ☺ or ). The
CCs appeared at two distances from the target location: ‘close to’ the target (i.e.,
near; ☺☺☺, ☺, etc.) or ‘farther away from the target’ (i.e., far; ☺ ☺ ☺,  ☺
, etc.). Participants were instructed to press the ‘Z’ key with their left hand if the
middle face is a sad-face and press the ‘M’ key with their right hand if the middle
face is happy. Neutral face (i.e.,) flankers (i.e., ☺ or ) were also used
as a near and far distance CC to evaluate the accuracy of the sad and happy
conditions, and to reflect previous literature for healthy controls. However, the
participants received no instructions on how to respond to the neutral CC.
Response windows auto-terminated at 2000 ms. An interval of 500 ms elapsed
between trials. The order of presentation of the trials target, distance and CCs
were randomized.
Procedure
The experimental session was in a quiet, laboratory setting. Participants
completed an informed consent, and were randomly assigned an anonymous
identification code for the experimental session. Next, paper surveys containing
demographic information, and mood assessment measures (e.g., STAI-T, CESD,
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and STAI-S, in that order) were completed in pen, by participants at a desktop
computer workstation. The workstation included a standard keyboard, mouse, 19
inch monitor and 3-sided privacy shields (one situated behind the computer and
one covering both the left and right side view-areas of the participant; limiting
participant-view to only his/her workstation).After the room-lights were turned off,
participants completed the EF computerized task, seated at a viewing distance of
approximately 30 inches from the monitor, and were asked to focus their field-ofview on the middle of the monitors screen. The experiment lasted approximately
40 minutes (Figure 15).

Figure 15. Participant‘s Experimental Progression.
SONA accessed outside laboratory. Laboratory experimental session: 5 minute
introduction (by only one a researcher to prevent confounds), participants
session number assigned by computer participant randomly chose. After
Emotional Flanker completion, experimental session ends with participate
logging name on sign-out sheet to receive academic credit.
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Design
This study involves a 2 X 2 X 3 repeated measures design. The principle
analyses will be within-group in nature. These will consist of repeated measures
ANOVAs of Target (happy-face vs. sad-face) by Distance (near vs. far) by
Congruency (congruent vs. neutral, vs. incongruent) conducted separately for
each of the four groups in the study (e.g., Control, State, Trait, Depression)
(Table 2).

Table 2. Independent Variable Stimuli and Conditions.

57

The four groups could not be included in the same analysis because the
groups are not mutually exclusive (i.e., some mood groups had participants with
comorbidity of high mood disorder scores; Figure 12) (Table 3).

Table 3. Participant Distribution across Mood Groups

To create the Control group, the lowest scoring participants on the CESD,
and STAI-S, and -T (i.e., scoring as having no depression, and no/low state or
trait anxiety) were taken from the Low Mood group (n = 33; also see Figure 12).
To create the depression, state anxiety, or trait anxiety groups, the highest
scoring participants were taken from the High Mood group (n = 33 each group;
see Figure 12). For example: Depression had, 'across one mood group' (i.e.,
depression; Table 3): 5 participants, 'across two groups' (Depression and state =
7, and depression and trait = 7): 14 participants, and 'across three mood groups'
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(Depression and state and trait): 14 participants; producing 5 + 14 + 14 = 33
participants in the depression group.
The Dependent variable is a quantitative, continuous variable: reaction
times in milliseconds (ms.). The mean score for each of the four groups (control =
558 ms., state = 604 ms., trait = 572 ms., depression = 578 ms.) was also
computed (Figure 4).

Table 4. Mood Group Mean Reaction Times

Results
Phase 1 Analysis
These analyses were undertaken to replicate prior effects in the literature
with healthy controls so as to establish that the current control sample is
comparable to samples previously employed in attention research. Specifically,
analyses were intended to replicate standard main effects for target emotionality
(happy, sad), distance (near, far), and congruency (congruent, neutral,
incongruent) in healthy controls. Millisecond reaction times were analyzed in a
repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). This 2 x 2 x 3 analysis was
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conducted on the control group (i.e., those without clinically depressive or
anxiolytic scores).
Phase 1 Results
Results indicated that there were significant target effects (F 1, 32 = 13.01,
p = .001), where happy targets were responded to significantly faster than sad,
and significant distance effects (F 1, 32 = 54.31, p < .001), where near responses
were faster than far. In addition, the congruency effect was significant (F 1, 32 =
20.37, p < .001). Congruent stimuli were responded to faster than incongruent
stimuli (Table 3, see table 5 for corresponding means and standard deviations).

Table 5. Control Group 2 X 2 X 3 ANOVA.

These data indicate that the control group correctly identified whether a
face was happy or sad and processed the positive or negative emotionality of the
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targets differently. The control group also correctly identified whether a distractor
face was near to, far from, the same as, or different from the target while
processing each change in distance or congruency in a unique fashion. Results
indicate that the control group mirrors the trends of publications on emotional
target-distractor relationships with /without a distance factor (Figures 16 & 17).

Figure 16. Phase 1 Analysis Results – Target and Congruency
Comparison of present study with prior findings in the literature. Significant target
and congruency effects. (A) Barratt and Bundesen (2012) Experiment 1, (B)
Fenske, and Eastwood (2003), and (C) Control group data. All RT data show the
same trend. Control group: Happy target responses are faster than sad (F 1, 32 =
13.01, p = .001), and happy congruent is faster than incongruent (F 1, 32 = 54.31,
p < .001), with sad target congruency effects non-significant. Confidence
intervals = .95.
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Figure 17. Phase 1 Analysis Results – Distance.
Comparison of present study with prior findings in the literature: distance effects..
(A) Olk, Dinu, Zielinski, & Kopper, (2018) (data illustration); F3, 75 = 15.48,
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.382, and (B) control group data. Both sets of RT data show the
same trend. Control group: Near distractor distance from target is associated with
faster RT than far (F = 13.01, p = .001, ηp2 = .63). Confidence intervals = .95.

Phase 2 Analysis
In order to test hypotheses 2 and 3, separate, within-group target (happy,
sad) by distance (near, far) by congruency (congruent, incongruent) ANOVAs
were conducted on participants’ mean reaction times for each of the three Mood
Disorder Groups (Figure 18).
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Figure 18. Mood Scores and Mood-group Assignments.
Psychological metric mood score valances and participant response distribution
(present study). (A) State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for State and Trait, and Center
for Disease Control Depression scale with number of participants who scored in
each metrics valance. (B) Histogram of (A) right side. The highest scoring 33
participants per metric were allocated to each mood group.

Phase 2 Results
Between Group Effects
Main effects. Target: There was a significant target main effect for the
control group (F(1, 32) = 13.07, p = .001, ηp2 = .29), but not for the State, Trait or
Depression groups (Table 6).
Table 6. Comparison of ANOVAs
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The control group’s mean RT for Happy targets (M = 551 ms) was faster than for
Sad targets (M = 565; Mdiff = -14.24). However theses effects were not present
in the State, Trait or Depression groups (Figures 7 and 8)
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Table 7. Comparison of Means and Standard Deviations

Table 8. Comparison of Effects
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Data from these within-group analyses (Figure 6) also suggest that RTs
were generally longer to both happy and sad targets in these groups compared
with the control group (Figures 7 and 8). To test whether the within group
condition RTs of control were significantly shorter than those of state, trait or
depression; we compared the conditional means of the control group to the other
three groups, using a student’s t-test (Table 9).

Table 9. Comparison of Conditions for Control vs. State, Trait, or Depression.

Results (Table 9) confirmed that the state group’s RTs (M = were significantly
slower than the control group for happy targets when near (Congruent: t(65) =
2.34, p = .022; ☺☺☺, Incongruent: t(65) = 2.39, p = .020; ☺), and when far
(Congruent: t(65) = 2.48, p = .016; ☺ ☺ ☺, Incongruent: t(65) = 2.16, p = .034; 
☺ ). When the state group viewed sad targets, they were also significantly
slower than control in response to far congruent distractors (t(65) = 2.03, p = .046;
  ). However, no other sad conditions for state, or any happy or sad
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condition for trait or depression groups differed from the control group
significantly.
These results indicate that while the groups were able to correctly identify
whether a face was happy or sad, the high state anxiety group was affected by
both the positive and the negative emotionality of the target to a greater extent
than controls (Figures 7 and 8). Since RTs were greater to happy and sad targets
in the high state anxiety group compared to controls, it seems that this group was
affected by emotionality to a greater degree than the controls. They did not show
a Target effect (i.e., state were not more significantly affected by negative than
positive targets). The controls were more affected by negative than by positive
targets (Tables 7 and 8).
Distance: There was a significant difference between near and far distance
conditions for the Control (F(1, 32) = 54.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .63), State (F(1, 32) =
43.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .58), Trait (F(1, 32) = 42.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .57), and
Depression (F(1, 32) = 44.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .58) groups (Table 4). RTs for
distractors in the Near position were faster than in the Far position for the Control
(Near: M =549, Far: M = 567, Mdiff = -17.78), State (Near: M = 596, Far: M =
611, Mdiff = -15.21), Trait (Near: M = 565, Far: M = 579, Mdiff = -14.41), and
Depression (Near: M = 570, Far: M = 585, Mdiff = -14.34) groups. These data
indicate that State, Trait and Depression groups were able to correctly identify
whether a distractor face was close to or far from the target face. They processed
the distance locations uniquely, mirroring the Control group (Tables 7 and 8).
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Congruency: There was a significant Congruency effect in RTs for the Control
(F(2, 64) = 20.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .39), State (F(2, 64) = 14.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .31),
Trait (F(2, 64) = 9.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .22), and Depression (F(2, 64) = 11.64, p < .001,
ηp2 = .27) groups (Table 4). In the Control group, RTs when distractors were
Congruent (M = 551) with the target were faster than when distractors were
Neutral (M = 556; Mdiff = -5.65) or Incongruent (M = 568, Mdiff = -16.89), and
RTs for the Neutral condition were faster than for Incongruent (Mdiff = -11.24)
condition. In State, Trait and Depression groups, there were no significant
differences between the Congruent and Neutral conditions. But RTs to
Congruent trials were faster than RTs to Incongruent trials in State (Congruent:
M = 597, Incongruent: M = 614, Mdiff = -16.72), Trait (Congruent: M = 566,
Incongruent: M = 580, , Mdiff = -14.69), and Depression (Congruent: M = 572,
Incongruent: M = 586, , Mdiff = -13.84) groups. In addition, RTs were faster under
the Neutral condition than the Incongruent condition for State (Neutral: M = 600,
Mdiff = -13.72), Trait (Neutral: M = 570, Mdiff = -10.28), and Depression (Neutral:
M = 575, Mdiff = -11.44) groups. These data indicate that, comparable to healthy
participants, State, Trait and Depression groups distinguished between
congruent and incongruent conditions. However, unlike the healthy participants,
these groups were not sensitive to the distinction between congruent and neutral
conditions (Tables 7 and 8).
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Interactions of Congruency with Distance and Target
To determine whether scope of attention varied by type of target (i.e.,
happy or sad) or degree of distance (i.e., near or far), the interactions between
congruency, distance, and target emotionality were considered. Again,
congruency effects are broad Attentional Scope Effects (ASE), and no
congruency effect is a narrow ASE. ASE types are categorize as :
advantageous, when they are the same as the control group, for that condition,
or effect, or disadvantageous if different than the control group.
Results indicated that the control and state groups showed a broad ASE
(i.e., a congruency effect) for both near and far conditions with happy targets.
Trait and depression, however, showed a narrow ASE (i.e., no congruency
effect) in the near condition with happy targets and a broad ASE in the far
condition with happy targets. All groups showed a narrow ASE when viewing Sad
targets at any distance, except for state anxiety in the sad, far, and congruent
condition, when compared to the control group (Table 9) (See Effects of Mood on
Attentional Scope, Healthy Controls and State Anxiety, para. 2)
These data show the state, trait and depression groups have the ability to
perceive the same amount of stimuli as the control group when viewing negative
items, at any distance, and when viewing positive items from afar. But when
focusing on near, happy items, trait and depression perceive significantly less
stimuli than the Control group (Figure 19).
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Figure 19. Mood Group Congruency and Attentional Scope Effects by Distance.
(A) Congruency effects (CE; significant difference marked with ‘*’ between C;
congruent = dark grey, and I; incongruent = light gray) per mood group for Near
or Far. Broad ASE = CE, Narrow ASE = No CE. (B) Attentional scope effects.
Congruency effect and RT variance with control group compared to either state,
trait or depression group. Data from Table 4, 7 & 8; confidence intervals = .95.
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CHAPTER SIX:
DISCUSSION

The measurement of congruency effects, in the near and far locations,
allowed us to evaluate the scope of attention for those with and without clinical
mood symptomology. All groups showed a narrowed ASE (scope of attention)
with sad targets regardless of whether distractors were in close proximity to the
target or were relatively distant from the target. Thus, when viewing negative
targets, the state, trait and depression groups demonstrated the same narrowed
scope of attention as the control group, and this was the case regardless of the
distracter location.
When viewing positive targets, we found that the scope of attention for the
state group was broad, like the control group. But in trait and depression, the
scope of attention was narrow (Figure 20).
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Figure 20. Hypothesized Compared to Experimental Outcomes.
(A) Hypothesized results per literary findings (Reprint: Figure 9). (B)
Experimental results. State: Prolonged RT to emotional stimuli, no ASE
difference to control group, but loss of target effect. Trait and depression: No RT
difference to emotional stimuli, but ASE narrow to happy targets and loss of
target effect. ASE: Attentional Scope Effect, ☺ = Happy or ☺ = Sad target,
elongated face = broad ASE, round face = narrow ASE.

We utilized the distance variable to plot the near and far congruencies
within each mood group, then examined the distances with a congruency effect
(i.e., a broad Attentional Scope Effect; ASE), and those without a congruency
effect (i.e., a narrow ASE) (Figure 21).
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Figure 21. Comparison of Mood Group Congruency by Distance.
Happy target only, *CE: I = Incongruent minus C = Congruent.
The state, trait and depression groups’ ASEs were comparable to those
for the control group when the distractors were in the far location (i.e., Broad
ASEs are reflected in a congruency effect at that distance location). However,
when distractors were in close proximity to a positive target, the control and state
groups showed a broad attentional scope while the trait and depression groups
showed a narrowed attentional scope (Figure 21). Thus, the state group does
not differ from the control group in terms of attentional scope (i.e., the state and
control groups show a congruency effect to positive targets and no congruency
effect to sad targets, regardless of the distractors’ degree of proximity to the
target). Therefore, the same amount of emotional information is entering
perception for state anxiolytics and health controls.
By contrast, the trait and depression groups differ from the control and
state groups in their ASE response to happy targets when distractors are in close
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proximity to the target. Therefore, although the trait and depression groups mirror
the control and state groups narrow ASEs when sad targets distractors are at
any proximity to the target, and mirror broad ASEs to happy targets when
distractors are far from the target, once the target is happy, and near, the trait
and depression groups show a narrow ASE (Figure 21). Said differently, when
salient-emotions are geographically close to positive stimuli, trait and depression
show no congruency effect. Therefore, a different amount of emotional
information (i.e., less data) is entering the perception of trait anxiety and
depressives than state anxiety or healthy controls (Figure 22).

Figure 22. Comparison of Mood-group Perception – Happy, Near.
Trait and depression perceive less emotional stimuli during happy targets with
nearby, salient emotional stimuli than healthy controls or state anxiolytics. Top
faces = salient emotions perceived, C = congruent, I = incongruent. *Congruency
effect (CE) = broad ASE. No CE = Narrow ASE.
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Why is it that high trait individuals and depressives show no congruency
effect to happy targets under the near distractor condition but do show a
congruency effect to happy faces under the far distractor condition? This is a
more complicated question. First, in evaluating the far condition, the presence of
a Broad ASE in the happy targets far distractor condition seems to reflect that
those with trait anxiety and depression have a decreased capacity to inhibit
processing of non-adjacent irrelevant information (i.e., one can’t help but see the
far distractors) (Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2007). This simply indicates that
depressives and trait anxiolytics are like healthy controls in having a broad
attentional scope to happy stimuli, and can identify the emotionality of the
changing distractors when they are at a distance from their focus. (i.e., they can
correctly evaluate non-focused-upon’ emotional information). This allows the
evaluation of many items in the environment; an advantage when approaching
other humans. Second, the presence of a Narrow ASE in the happy target, near
condition could reflect an increased capacity to inhibit processing of spatially
adjacent irrelevant information. But why would depressive and trait anxiolytics
have greater inhibitory capabilities than health controls? It may be that these
mood disorders involve some kind of difficulty with controlling attention to
emotionally salient targets when distractors of any kind are in close proximity.
This would constitute a lack of control over attentional processes when emotion
is involved. Whether the target is happy or sad, these individuals may tend to
narrow their focus when distractors are in close proximity to the target. This is
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supported by the loss of target effects for trait anxiety and depression seen in
Table 6. This could be a reaction to being over stimulated (i.e., overexertion of
the normal cyclical, repetitive mechanisms of thought) by the emotionality of
multiple closely-spaced targets (i.e., making the issue an inability to process any
emotional stimuli when near, not an issue with a specific emotion, or emotional
salience).

Prediction versus Outcome
Replication of Previous Findings
Our first hypothesis concerned the replication of standard effects
previously found in the literature. This successful replication established the
current sample of control group participants to be typical of samples previously
employed in the literature. Therefore, we established the external validity of the
following findings: healthy controls showed target effects (i.e., happy had faster
mean RTs than sad), distance effects (i.e., near was responded to faster than
far) and congruency effects (i.e., congruent was responded to faster than
Incongruent). Additionally, a congruency effect was present for happy targets, but
not for sad targets, such that the control group showed broad attentional scope
effects (ASE; i.e., where there is a congruency effect present) during
presentation of happy targets in the near condition. We had presented an
additional, conditional hypothesis, that we may see broad ASEs in the happy
target, far condition. Although there is less previous research on the distance by
congruency interaction, the available findings are consistent with the presence of
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a congruency effect. Indeed we found congruency effects in the happy far
condition. These findings support our assertion that the control group is
representative of the larger, healthy population.
Effects of Mood on Attentional Scope
Healthy Controls and State Anxiety. We hypothesized that the healthy
controls and state anxiety would show target effects, distance effects, and
congruency effects. Distance and congruency effects were found in state anxiety,
but target effects were not present (Table 6). This unexpected loss of emotional
differentiation and its effect on the ASE, will be expanded upon below (see Loss
of the Target Effect). We hypothesized that there would be a congruency effect
for happy targets but not for sad targets. That is, controls and state would show
broad ASEs during presentation of happy targets in the near, and possibly far
conditions, but those ASEs may be significantly slower than the control groups.
These expected congruency effects were confirmed for both sad and
happy targets in both the near and far conditions. RTs to happy targets with
distractors in the near and far conditions occurred significantly slower than for the
control group (Figure 19). Response to sad targets with congruent distractors, at
the far distance (i.e.,   ), were also significantly slower than the control
group (Table 9). Congruent sad is the most negative condition, used herein, and
no other such significant results were found for trait or depression (when
compared to control). Therefore, these data suggests that state sufferers are
highly biased toward negative or fear items (Table 9).
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Healthy Controls and Trait Anxiety. We hypothesized that the healthy
controls and trait anxiety groups would show target effects, distance effects, and
congruency effects. Distance and congruency effects were found in trait anxiety,
but target effects were not (See Loss of the Target Effect) (Table 6). Congruency
effects were hypothesized to be obtained for happy targets but not for sad
targets. That is, it was expected that controls and trait anxiolytics would show
broad ASEs during presentation of happy targets in the near, and possibly the
far, conditions.
Congruency effects for sad targets, at any distance, and for happy targets
at the far distractor-distance, were confirmed. However, predictions for the trait
group’s response to happy targets in the near location were not confirmed
(Figure 19). We reasoned that the trait group’s enhanced recognition for faces
would result in the retention of a broad ASE even in the presence of decreased
inhibition to negative distractors. However, we were incorrect in our assertion. It
seems that the reduced inhibition to negative distractors for those who
experience trait anxiety is a stronger influence on the modulation of the ASE than
enhanced recognition for faces. Another intervening factor could be that the
enhanced recognition for emotional faces is stronger for sad than happy faces,
leaving, happy targets to be overwhelmed by negative emotional distractions.
Additionally, we predicted that the RT for those ASEs would be no different than
the control groups; this was confirmed by the data (Table 9).
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Healthy Controls and Depression. We hypothesized that the healthy
controls and the depression group would show target effects and distance
effects, but would differ in regard to congruency effects. Distance effects were
found for the depressives, but not target effects (see Loss of the Target Effect)
(Table 6). In addition, and as predicted, the groups showed different congruency
effects. That is, no congruency effects were expected in the depression group for
happy targets or for sad targets, and, with the exception of happy targets in the
far condition, none were found. It had been hypothesized that depression would
result in a narrow ASE in near and possibly far conditions due to the inability to
inhibit negative distractors. This was confirmed to be true. The RTs to happy and
sad targets were also hypothesized to be significantly slower than for the control
group. However, this was not the case (Table 9). This may be explained by the
fact that a narrow ASE for depressives equated to ‘perceiving no distractors’ or
‘perceiving the target only’.
Effect Loss
Loss of Targets Effect. Loss of target effects were found in the state
anxiety, trait anxiety, and depression groups (Table 6). Target effects are an
inherent human survival mechanism which are evident in RT differences between
responding to a positive or a negative emotional target (i.e., happy faces are
responded to faster than sad faces in healthy individuals). Therefore, loss of a
target-effect is essentially a reduction in the ability to distinguish emotional
stimuli. Loss of target effects illustrates that the brain’s emotional processing
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centers (i.e., ACC/MCC) are unable to formulate unique, emotion-related,
responses. However, each participant in the state, trait and depression groups
correctly identified whether a target face was happy or sad (i.e., each subject’s
accuracy score was no less than 30% below the mean accuracy score of that
condition). This data shows evidence that the state, trait and depression subjects’
brains have the ability to perceive whether a target is exhibiting the emotions of
happy or sad. Therefore, at least a portion of the brains emotional processing
centers are working in state, trait and depression groups.
Loss of the Distractor’s Effect. Distinction of distractors plays an integral
part in the measurement of the ASE. Distractor differentiation is seen in the
congruency effect (see Table 6, Congruency row for congruency per mood group
and Figures 21 and 22 for distractors loss per mood group). In the case of unperceived distractors, the mind does not place them into memory (Heurley, &
Ferrier, 2015; Martin, 1992; Mitterer, Horschig, Müsseler, & Majid, 2009).
Therefore, these data reveal that trait anxiolytics and depressives’
perception of the emotional-world (i.e., their ‘map-of-life’ or their overall
experience of the moment) is significantly different than those in the control
group and state anxiety group (Figure 22). This suggests that small group social
interaction, which occurs in almost every moment of work, school, or home life,
would have missing data for trait anxiolytics and depressives; data which healthy
brains readily perceive.
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This missing data would pertain to any emotional content that is not in
one’s specific focus, at a given moment. Evaluating the emotional saliency of a
group has been hard-wired into the human brain, Therefore, the exclusion of
group emotional dynamics alters the assessment of the human environment, the
perception of one’s future in that environment, and the way humans perceive
ongoing human emotional-interactions. In short, the loss of perception of
emotional distractors alters the human experience and expectations of our
ongoing emotional-place in society.
Loss of the Attentional Scope’s Effect. Happy emotionally-salient
encounters tend to intensify at close range (i.e., when other humans are near).
‘Near’ interactions are found in most interpersonal settings (i.e., at work, with
friends), and it is these interactions that would be the most necessary to
build/maintain positive social-emotional effects both in society and in the
individual. However, Trait and Depression showed a narrowed ASE in response
to positive stimuli with near distractors (Figure 21 and 22). This would indicate
that those with Trait anxiety or Depression could not accurately distinguish the
current group’s emotional changes. Without the ability to process small group
interactions, a human would be unable to adapt to social changes.

Implications of the Mood Driven Attentional Scope
Perceiving the Negative
The mood-driven scope of attention has implications during social
interactions; some are advantageous, and some detrimental. Socially, a narrow
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ASE, when focusing on a negative (i.e. sad or dangerous) target, at any distance,
is an advantageous, survival-based response (Coon, & Mitterer, 2008; Smith,
Seger, & Mackie, 2007). Negative items need to be scrutinized for their level of
threat in an on-going and preferential manner, and the brain tries to assure that
distractions are not permitted (Kolb, & Whishaw, 2015; Stöttinger, & Perner,
2006). Healthy control, state and trail anxiety and depression participants
responded in this adaptive manner to sad targets, with one exception: State
anxiety, with sad targets having far, congruent distractors (Table 9).
The data suggests that when state anxiolytics view a sad target, with far
away emotional distractors, their ASE broadens when compared to control (Table
9). This is a reversal of the advantageous ASE narrowing seen in all other groups
during sad items of focus. To investigate this conditional event, we evaluated the
ASE of each condition, separately (Table 10).
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Table 10. Perception of Stimuli (A) by Mood Group (B-E)
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These data (Figure 10) reveal some interesting differences between the
ASEs and therefore the perception of emotional stimuli of all groups. Firstly,
these data reflects that the tenants of attentional control to sad stimuli are being
utilized in a beneficial and survival-prone manner by trait and depression (Figure
19 and the non-significant results in Table 9). Examples of this could range from
a bear in the woods to approaching a friend who responds with a frown; both
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inform human survival needs (Brosch, Pourtois, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2011;
Graziano, 2014; Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2011). The same was true of the state
group, but with one exception: sad target, far distractor, congruent condition (i.e.,
  ; Table 9; state column). This bias for the highly negative, emotion-based
stimuli cannot be categorized as a healthy, or as an advantageous attentional
mechanism.
Secondly, compared to the RTs of all other groups, the state groups sad,
far, congruent RTs, are extremely slow (M = 612), compared to control (M =
571), or trait (M = 576) or depression (M = 586) (Table 7). This indicates the state
anxiety group is spending a large amount of neural effort observing the sad, far,
congruent condition. The interesting portion of this occurrence is that the state
participants are only experiencing this slowing when the distractors are far from
the target. Therefore, as seen in trait and depressions inability to evaluate near
emotional saliency of a happy targets distractors when they are in close prolixity
to the target-emotion, we see states inability to ‘disengage’ or perhaps ’efficiently
process’ sad target when sad distractors are at a distance.
Even though the state group should have a narrow ASE, and only
perceive the sad emotional stimuli, the state group perceives a difference in the
sad targets congruent condition (Table 9). However, there was no significant
difference between sad, far incongruent in state vs. control (Table 9; last 2 rows),
and state had no congruency effect for the sad far condition (Figures 21 and 22).
This implies that the state group did not perceive a difference in the sad
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incongruent distractors over any other sad target congruencies, at any distance.
This data examples, with the exception of the sad, far, congruent condition, that
the state brain perceived all other sad target distance congruencies with a narrow
ASE (i.e., the advantageous, survival-based awareness, limited to the perception
of only the danger target , and excluding distractors).
Lastly, the state groups sad, far, congruent, broad ASE also implies that
the state group recognized the distractor-type (i.e., negative), at a particular
distance (i.e., far), during a time when the brain should have activated the fear
response, triggering a narrow ASE to inhibit distractors and increase survival
during danger. For state, this broad ASE is a complete divergence from a healthy
scope of attention during sad emotional stimuli (i.e., the ASE should be narrow).
The consequences of this ASE reversal would evidence in a heightened
perception of fear items in the environment. Said differently, where state should
advantageously focus on the one threat item (i.e.,), this disadvantageously
broad ASE would, instead, force processing of all items (i.e., ) during the
most neurologically taxing distance, far (i.e.,   ).
Functionally, these data would have the real-world consequence of
perceiving a higher amount of danger than other groups (i.e., a group of people
frowning may seem like anger, or seeing joggers approach may be identified as
‘intent to harm’). Therefore, state anxiolytics may exhibit the same behavioral
markers of social withdrawal or isolation as seen in depression, but for a different
reason. If every slightly negative group viewed from afar was perceived as high
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danger, no one would approach a social gathering. Furthermore, because the
enhanced fear is occurring at a far distance, state anxiety sufferers would have
motivation to flee, not approach and reassess.
Therefore, where intimate social conversations are hard for trait and
depression to decipher, state individuals would not get to the intimate
conversation stage as they would self-isolate for protection.
Perceiving the Positive
Socially, a broad ASE, when focusing on a positive (i.e. happy or safe)
target, at any distance, is an advantageous, survival-based response (Coon, &
Mitterer, 2008; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007).
All groups showed a broad scope of attention to happy targets, when
competing emotional information in distractor faces was distant from the target.
The analogous real life situation might be if your friend, the item of focus,
displays a happy facial expression, but those at other tables are clearly sad or
angry, suggesting that the happy display you are engaged in may be
‘inappropriate for the circumstances’. The mood disorders studied here appear to
have a comparable level of sensitivity (to healthy individuals) when the target is
happy (i.e., is safe) and the emotional salience is far away. Here, the scope of
attention allows recognition that the surrounding environment has become
negative, and the ability to immediately recognize that change is imperative to
survival.
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An interesting, and perhaps puzzling aspect of these results is that once
groups were viewing a happy target in the near condition, these groups displayed
some drastic changes. The control group and the state group, with broad ASEs,
could discern similarities or differences between target and distractor emotional
displays, but the Trait and Depression groups displayed narrow ASEs, and could
not.
A broad scope of attention brings with it the ability to differentiate among
the emotional states within a group of individuals (Barratt & Bundesen, 2012;
Diéguez-Risco, Aguado, Albert, & Hinojosa, 2015; Kanske & Kotz, 2011).
Humans spend their lives evaluating other humans’ emotional output for possible
signs of danger/no-danger so that the appropriate social interaction can
commence (i.e., are they happy to see me, scared of me, might yell at me?).
Without the ability to emotionally gauge our environment, quickly and accurately,
from afar (i.e. an ability all the groups have) and then confirm our environmental
state when near (i.e., an ability which trait and depression don’t have), our
chances for physical, social, and emotional survival are decreased. In fact, one
could argue, that the evaluation of the emotional variance of those humans
nearest to you is the most important aspect of survival. The ones nearest you
could pose the most danger. Therefore, those without the ability to assess
emotions in the happy, near condition, could be most vulnerable to physical,
emotional, psychological harm in our society.
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Functioning With a Mood Disorder
These data reflect that functioning with a mood disorder means
functioning at a disadvantage when perceiving emotion. The state group is
functioning perceptually like the control group (i.e., has comparably, broad ASEs,
in the happy target near congruencies), just less efficiently responding. An
example of how this might evidence in a state anxiolytic is that they might be
slow to perceive when others are upset (i.e., whether the upset person is focus of
their attention, or part of the group dynamic). We could assume that taking
significantly longer to process emotional information on an ongoing basis could
be social deemed as being mean, unfeeling toward others emotional states, or
allow the individual to take too long to interpret a negative emotional situation to
the point that their survival is in peril.
Those who have, trait anxiety and depression would have difficulties
‘reading the room’ so to speak in close interactions. They would be unable to
gauge the emotionality of a small group (i.e., only divining the emotionality of the
focus of their attention). This would make it harder to function in social, business,
and family setting where the social system includes concurrent interactions with
multiple emotional states (i.e., every situation). A simple example could be a trait
anxiolytic or depressive individual watching a video and is unable to process the
happy or annoyed motion exhibited in their spouse.
The trait anxiety and depressive groups show that they are not responding
differently (i.e., significantly slower) than the control group, but, depressives
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mirror traits ‘inability to gauge the emotionality of a group’ (i.e., they have the
same narrow attentional scope in the happy near condition).Both depression and
trait have a decreased ability to limit negative distractors, which creates an
inability to decipher emotion in a group setting, and may explain the depressed
symptomology related to the withdrawal from social function; as exerting energy
and still not be able to process the emotions of multiple people at once, would
create a large neural load. However, it does not explain the mechanism in trait
anxiolytics who do not exhibit social withdrawal.
These results suggest that state anxiolytics are relatively slower in
responding to emotional information in a facial stimulus. Once they identify the
face as sad at far range, they experience a broad ASE and a heightened fear
response. Once they identify the face as happy at close range, they achieve the
same, broad, scope of attention as healthy individuals. By contrast, once
depressives and trait anxiolytics identify a positive emotional expression, they are
restricted in their ability to recognize contrasting or changing expressions in
individuals who are in close proximity to their focus of attention. Depressives and
individuals with high trait anxiety have a relatively narrower SoA, restricting their
perception of close-range emotional-interactions. The present findings indicate
that individuals with mood disorders process emotional information differently
than healthy individuals.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, the findings of this study show that the attentional scope
effect is a behavioral-marker of distinct mood disorders; even in a comorbid
environment. Therefore, these data provide evidence that the scope of attention’s
modulation can be utilized to ascertain if each, individual, mood-disorder is
present, even in the presence of other, highly correlated mood-disorders.
Furthermore, these data provide evidence that those suffering disorders of
mood exhibit a disadvantageous modulation their scope of attention during
emotional interactions. As the scope of attention sets the limits of visual
emotional perception, the data suggests humans with mood-disorders perceive
the emotional world differently than those without a mood-disorder.

Limitations
The first limitation was sample size. A larger sample size would allow a
greater number of high scorers, allowing the inclusion of mood-groups with
higher mean scores, and providing a larger differentiation between groups. The
second limitation may have been comorbidities between mood-groups.
Evaluating groups without mood comorbidities may allow a more realistic
correlation of the effect of mood on attentional scope. However, the goal of this
study was to identify if the attentional scope effected real-life emotional
perception during mood. With high comorbidity a reality in the human populous,
the concern may be mute, and perhaps studies containing mood-comorbidities
should be the norm (i.e., analyzed as depression + trait level, depression + state
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level, etc. The third limitation is the ‘unforeseen interaction’; an undefined
mediator or moderator may be present (i.e., effecting mood vs. the scope of
attention), making these results not solely attributable to the ASE.

Future Research
It has been suggested that attention deficits may precede the emergence
of mood-disorders (Leppänen, 2006), suggesting that those at risk for developing
a disorder of mood may present with the same biases in attention and attentional
scope inherent to diagnosed individuals. Therefore, future research should focus
on the neuroimaging of human patients using a target-distractor with distance
task to compare attentional scope effects with brain size in those with or without
diagnosed mood disorders. Brain size is a biological marker, or biomarker, of a
current or possible mood-disorder, therefore, attentional scope abnormalities
may correlate as a behavioral marker of mood-disorders.
Additionally, future research should focus on a substituting a behavioralmarker for the current first-line pharmacological interventions though
computational behavioral tasks. Medical diagnostic process for most patients
includes answering limited questions or expressing an interpretation of their own
symptomology. Due to co-morbid symptomology throughout mood-disorders
(Spielberger, et, al., 1983; Vitasari, et al., 2011; Yang, et al., 2016), the physician
then prescribes the ‘best’ pharmacology for the expressed symptomology (i.e., I
feel sleepy, I feel anxious, I don’t like to do things anymore). This leads to high
misdiagnosis and low symptomology resolution on the 1st medication prescribed.
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Therefore, future research should investigate the creation of a shortened
computational intervention during the patient’s waiting room time to help target
the pharmacology or other intervention prescribed. This would also allow realtime tracking of the patients ASE with an effective, statistical correlation of moodbehavioral-data. This illuminates the possibility of medical intervention before a
transient mood-variance becomes a pathological mood-disorder (i.e., something
not available at this time).
A longitudinal study in a medically-based facility, where healthy controls,
pre-diagnosed, possible misdiagnosed, and post diagnosed individuals could
repeat the task over a period of years could investigate the ASE over time in
healthy vs. mood-disordered groups. The attentional scope differences could be
tracked and correlated to the expression, progression, or resolutions of disease
symptomology. The benefit would be to advance our understanding of the normal
scope of attention, and/or normal perception-differences over the lifetime
Lastly, future research should allocate focus to those within the Autism
Spectrum population. Autisms social-emotional and functional aspects are
complex. One of the most severe barriers to quality of life and social interaction is
the autistic propensity to withdraw from human interaction, while leaning toward
non-human interaction (i.e., choosing to interact with a cell phone or computer
over a person). This creates a divide which prohibits that patient, their family, and
medical professionals from understanding what the autistic spectrum patient
perceives or how their perception of an event may differ from the non-autistic
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population. Therefore, the future application of this paradigm to those within the
autism spectrum may allow non-autistics to glimpse perceptual differences
leading to more targeted or more effective therapies for those with autism.
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APPENDIX A:
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD (IRB) APPROVAL
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APPENDIX B:
STATE-TRAIT ANXIETY INVENTORY - TRAIT (STAI-T)
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STAI-T
Participant instructions: Below is a list of statements which can be used to
describe how people feel. Beside each statement are four numbers which
indicate the degree with which each statement is self-descriptive of your mood in
general (e.g., 1 = not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = moderately, 4 = very much so). Please
read each statement carefully and circle the number which best indicates how
you feel in general, or over the last 1 to 2 weeks.
1-------------------------------2-------------------------------3---------------------------------4
Not at all
A Little
Moderately
Very Much So
Questions:
1. My heart beats fast.
2. My muscles are tense.
3. I feel agonized over my problems.
4. I think that others won’t approve of me.
5. I feel like I’m missing out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon
enough.
6. I feel dizzy.
7. My muscles feel weak.
8. I feel trembly and shaky.
9. I picture some future misfortune.
10. I can’t get some thought out of my mind.
11. I have trouble remembering things.
12. My face feels hot.
13. I think that the worst will happen.
14. My arms and legs feel stiff.
15. My throat feels dry.
16. I keep busy to avoid uncomfortable thoughts.
17. I cannot concentrate without irrelevant thoughts intruding.
18. My breathing is fast and shallow.
19. I worry that I cannot control my thoughts as well as I would like to.
20. I have butterflies in the stomach.
21. My palms feel clammy.
(Spielberger, 1972; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983)
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STATE-TRAIT ANXIETY INVENTORY - STATE (STAI-S)
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STAI-S
Participant instructions: Below is a list of statements which can be used to
describe how people feel. Beside each statement are four numbers which
indicate the degree with which each statement is self-descriptive of mood at this
moment (e.g., 1 = not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = moderately, 4 = very much so).
Please read each statement carefully and circle the number which best indicates
how you feel right now, at this very moment, even if this is not how you usually
feel.
1-------------------------------2-------------------------------3---------------------------------4
Not at all
A Little
Moderately
Very Much So
Questions:
1. My heart beats fast.
2. My muscles are tense.
3. I feel agonized over my problems.
4. I think that others won’t approve of me.
5. I feel like I’m missing out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon
enough.
6. I feel dizzy.
7. My muscles feel weak.
8. I feel trembly and shaky.
9. I picture some future misfortune.
10. I can’t get some thought out of my mind.
11. I have trouble remembering things.
12. My face feels hot.
13. I think that the worst will happen.
14. My arms and legs feel stiff.
15. My throat feels dry.
16. I keep busy to avoid uncomfortable thoughts.
17. I cannot concentrate without irrelevant thoughts intruding.
18. My breathing is fast and shallow.
19. I worry that I cannot control my thoughts as well as I would like to.
20. I have butterflies in the stomach.
21. My palms feel clammy.
(Spielberger, 1972; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983)
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CESD
Participant instructions: You will be shown a list of some ways you may have felt
or behaved. Please indicate how often you have felt this way during the last week
by selecting the appropriate response.
1------------------------------2---------------------3---------------------------------------4
Rarely
Some
Occasionally
Most
or none
or a little
or a moderate amount
or all
of the time
of the time
of time
of the time
(less than 1 day) (1-2 days)
(3-4 days)
(5-7 days)
Questions:
1. I was bothered by things that usually don't bother me
2. I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor
3. I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with help from my family or
friends
4. I felt I was just as good as other people
5. I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing
6. I felt depressed
7. I felt that everything I did was an effort
8. I felt hopeful about the future
9. I thought my life had been a failure
10. I felt fearful
11. My sleep was restless
12. I was happy
13. I talked less than usual
14. I felt lonely
15. People were unfriendly
16. I enjoyed life
17. I had crying spells
18. I felt sad
19. I felt that people disliked me
20. I could not get going

(Radloff, 1977)
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